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MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS DEFINED BY THE INJURY:
SUCCESSIVE TORTFEASOR LIABILITY AFTER
PAYNE V. HALL
MEGAN P. DUFFY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple tortfeasor liability has been the bane of New Mexico tort law for years,
largely because the New Mexico Legislature and New Mexico courts have failed to
articulate a clear method on how to approach and resolve successive tortfeasor
issues.' The primary confusion lies in how to apportion liability among multiple
tortfeasors, how and to what extent comparative fault may be presented at trial, and
how to properly instruct the jury on these complex issues.
In the past three decades, New Mexico courts have encountered only a handful
of opportunities in which to navigate this murky territory.2 Payne v. Hall (Payne 1)3
is the most recent decision on multi-tortfeasor issues and it attempts to clarify the
longstanding confusion surrounding these cases. In order to understand the
significance of the court's decision in Payne II,4 this Note begins by exploring the
complex historical development of successive tortfeasor law in New Mexico.5 After
looking at the facts of Payne II in Part 111,6 Part IV turns to the framework set forth
by the New Mexico Supreme Court for analyzing multiple tortfeasor fact-patterns.7
Subsequently, Part V examines the practical effect of Payne II on multiple tortfeasor
issues by illustrating how Payne II applies in a variety of tort scenarios; this section
scrutinizes how the different theories of liability affect plaintiffs in proving their
case, and how defendants may use comparative negligence to offset their liability.
This section concludes by exploring how fault can be apportioned differently based
on suggestions presented by Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe8 and Judge
Alarid's special concurrence to the New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision in
Payne . 9
* Class of 2008, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to extend my gratitude to
Professor M.E. Occhialino for all of his time and thoughtful help in preparing this Note; his knowledge on the
subject is impressive and inspiring. Additionally, I would like to thank my editors: Margot Sigal, for her patience,
guidance, and encouragement; Barry Berenberg, for his attention to detail; Richard Hatch, for his frank advice; and
Deana Bennett, for everything.
1. See generally Payne v. Hall (Payne I), 2006-NMSC-029, 10, 137 P.3d 599, 603 (citing M.E.
Occhialino, Bartlett Revisited: New Mexico Tort Law Twenty Years After the Abolition of Joint and Several
Liability-Part One, 33 N.M. L. REv. 1 (2003) (discussing the history ofjoint and several liability in New Mexico)).
2. For a review of cases tracing the development of concurrent and successive tortfeasor liability in New
Mexico, see Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982); Duran v.
General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983); Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe,
107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1987); Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d
1025 (1995); and Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972. See also infra Part II.
3. 2006-NMSC-029, 137 P.3d 599.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part Ill.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1987).
9. Payne v. Hall (Payne 1), 2004-NMCA- 113, 98 P.3d 1030; see infra Part V.
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Finally, this Note concludes by assessing how Payne I may affect practitioners.'°
The direct effect arises from the proposal and adoption of new uniform jury
instructions that are specifically tailored to successive tortfeasor cases.1' However,
Payne II is arguably more valuable as an example of the difficulties a plaintiff may
experience through various choices in approaching a successive tortfeasor action and
illustrates indirectly that practitioners should argue both concurrent and successive
theories of liability, alternatively, when trying multiple tortfeasor cases. 12 Through
an awareness of the opportunities and pitfalls presented in multi-tortfeasor fact
patterns, practitioners may successfully litigate these complex cases and avoid a
myriad of stumbling blocks along the way.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the rationale and implications set forth in Payne II, 1 3 it is useful
to understand the terminology of multiple tortfeasor cases. As a practical matter,
when one person injures another, the party causing the injury is called a tortfeasor.
When an injury is caused by two or more tortfeasors, these situations are generally
referred to as multiple tortfeasor scenarios.
There are two types of multiple tortfeasor scenarios, which are classified by the
number of injuries caused to a third party. 4 The more common situation involves
concurrent tortfeasors, where two or more persons combine to cause a single,
indivisible injury to a third party. 5 A classic concurrent tort is illustrated by the
example of a chain reaction car accident. In this scenario, two or more cars collide
with the plaintiff's car and cause an injury (or injuries) to the plaintiff that cannot
be identified with the individual drivers and impacts. 16 Because the plaintiffs
injuries cannot be readily divided and attributed to specific drivers, the plaintiff's
condition is viewed as a single, overall injury caused by the combined acts of
multiple tortfeasors. 7
Conversely, the less common multi-tortfeasor pattern involves successive tort-
feasors who cause two or more separate, divisible injuries: a first injury caused by
a first tortfeasor, followed by a distinct second injury caused by a second tort-
feasor. 8 In referring to successive tortfeasor scenarios, the parties are defined as the
"original" tortfeasor, who causes the first or original injury, and the "successive"
tortfeasor, who causes another separate or enhanced injury that is distinct and
10. See infra Part VI.
Il. See infra Part VI.B.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. Payne v. Hall (Payne II), 2006-NMSC-029, 137 P.3d 599.
14. See id. i 11-12, 137 P.3d at 603-04.
15. See Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422,425, 902 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1995); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1527 (8th ed. 2004).
16. See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 148 P.3d 814; Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply,
Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
17. Cf Gulf Ins. Co., 2006-NMCA-150, IN 4-5, 21-22, 148 P.3d 814, 816-17, 821.
18. The resulting injury could also be a distinct enhancement of the first injury. See Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-
029, 1 12, 137 P.3d at 604. Successive tortfeasors are two or more parties whose actions may occur at different times
and cause different injuries to the same plaintiff. See Lujan, 120 N.M. at 425, 902 P.2d at 1028.
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divisible from the original injury.' 9 These classifications were traditionally
distinguished by the temporal relationship 2° between the acts and by the divisibility
of the resulting injury or injuries.2' A common successive tortfeasor example occurs
when the plaintiff is injured in a car accident caused by the original tortfeasor; the
plaintiff is then taken to the hospital where she suffers a second injury as the result
of negligent medical treatment.22
New Mexico courts use concurrent and successive tortfeasor classifications to
determine the type and extent of liability imposed on each tortfeasor.23 Historically,
concurrent tortfeasors were subject to joint and several liability,24 where any one of
the individual tortfeasors may be held liable for the entire harm, regardless of his
individual amount of fault.25 While joint and several liability was widely disfavored
by defendants,26 the New Mexico Supreme Court justified its use by stating that,
"[u]nder traditional principles of causation, if the plaintiff could not prove what
portion of a single injury each of two concurrent tortfeasors had caused, that
plaintiff could not recover damages from either wrongdoer.' '27 However, "[r]ather
than permit wrongdoers to escape without liability, American jurisdictions,
including New Mexico, adopted the rule that each concurrent tortfeasor is jointly
and severally liable for the entire harm., 28 Accordingly, "[t]his solution assures
recovery for the [plaintiff] even in the absence of proof allocating the injury between
19. Richard E. Ransom, Successive-Torifeasor Liability after Payne v. Hall: More Light, N.M. TRIAL LAW.,
Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 77, 91.
20. See Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029, 15, 137 P.3d at 604 (citing Occhialino, supra note 1, at 21). For a
discussion of the New Mexico Supreme Court's rejection of a temporal analysis in favor of a focus on the
divisibility of the injury or injuries, see infra Part IV.A.
21. Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029,1 12, 137 P.3d at 604.
22. See, e.g., Lujan, 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025.
23. See Payne 1, 2006-NMSC-029, 12, 137 P.3d at 604.
24. See Lujan, 120 N.M. at 425, 902 P.2d at 1028; see also Andrew G. Schultz & M.E. Occhialino, Statutory
Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A Commentary and Quasi-Legislative History, 18 N.M. L. REv. 483,
494 (1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 879 cmt. b (1979) ("If the tortious conduct of each of two or more
persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm,
irrespective of whether their conduct is concurring or consecutive." (emphasis added)).
Comment a of the Restatement (Second) of Torts further states:
One whose tortious conduct is otherwise one of the legal causes of an injurious result is not
relieved from liability for the entire harm by the fact that the tortious act of another responsible
person contributes to the result. Nor are the damages against him diminished. This is true when
both are simultaneously negligent, and also when the act of one either occurs or takes harmful
effect after that of the other. It is immaterial that as between the two, one of them was primarily
at fault for causing the harm or that the other, upon payment of damages, would be entitled to
indemnity against him. It is also immaterial that the conduct of one was seriously wrongful while
the conduct of the other was merely negligent or, indeed, blameless.
Id. cmt. a. Joint and several liability is defined as "[Il]iability that may be apportioned either among two or more
parties or to only one or a few select members of the group, at the adversary's discretion." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 933.
25. See Payne I!, 2006-NMSC-029, 11, 137 P.3d at 604; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABImTY § 10 (2000).
26. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. Generally, joint and several liability required a single
defendant to pay more damages that he or she was individually responsible for. See infra notes 52-58 and
accompanying text. In addition, "U]oint and several liability imposes the risk that one or more tortfeasors liable for
the plaintiff's damages is insolvent on the remaining solvent defendants, while several liability imposes this
insolvency risk on the plaintiff." RESTATEMENT (TlHIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABiITY § 10 cmt. a.
27. Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 425, 902 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1995).
28. Id.
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its two negligent causes."2 9 After the plaintiff is awarded a judgment against one
defendant, 30 the burden then shifts to the liable defendant to pursue the remaining
tortfeasors for indemnification3' or contribution.32
Whereas concurrent tortfeasors were subject to joint and several liability, the
"analysis shifts when successive tortfeasors cause separate divisible injuries. 33 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states, "If two or more persons, acting independently,
tortiously cause distinct harms,.. .each is subject to liability only for the portion of
the total harm that he has himself caused. '3' Thus, under the Restatement, when
injuries are divisible, successive tortfeasors are subject to several liability, where
each tortfeasor is only liable to the extent of his individual fault.35 Unlike concurrent
tortfeasors, no single tortfeasor in a successive tort scenario would be wholly
responsible for all of the damages.3 6 Therefore, several liability requires the plaintiff
to bring suit against each tortfeasor that may be liable for her damages in order to
achieve a full recovery.37
29. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 24, at 494 ("Rather than rule against the plaintiff for failure to establish
causation, the law instead chose to impose joint and several liability on the tortfeasors who caused the indivisible
injury.").
30. There is still some ambiguity regarding the time frame for indemnification and contribution in New
Mexico under Rule 1-014(A) NMRA. New Mexico courts have not determined whether the defendant's right to
indemnification and contribution begins after a judgment has been entered against the defendant (or when the
defendant actually pays for the plaintiffs injury), or whether indemnification and contribution are controlled by the
underlying statute of limitations for the original tort. See Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 1 7 n.2, 137 P.3d at 602 n.2.
31. Indemnity is defined as
[a] duty to make good any loss, damage, or liability, incurred by another. (2) The right of an
injured party to claim reimbursement for its loss, damage, or liability from a person who has
such a duty (3) Reimbursement or compensation for loss, damage, or liability in tort; esp., the
right of a party who is secondarily liable to recover from the party who is primarily liable for
reimbursement of expenditures paid to a third party for injuries resulting from a violation of a
common law duty.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 784.
32. Contribution is defined as
[t]he right that gives one of several persons who are liable on a common debt the ability to
recover ratably from each of the others when that one person discharges the debt for the benefit
of all; the right to demand that another who is jointly responsible for a third party's injury supply
part of what is required to compensate the third party.
Id. at 352-53.
33. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 12, 137 P.3d at 604.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 881 (1979) (emphasis added). Comment a continues:
This Section is an application of § 433A, where the distinction is made between harm that is
single and indivisible and hence is not to be apportioned among the various causes that
contribute to it, and harms that are distinct or that afford a reasonable basis for division, in which
case the apportionment of damages is made. This Section is concerned only with harms that are
distinct or divisible. When the tortious conduct of two or more persons has contributed to harm
of this type, the liability is apportioned among them and each is held liable only for the
proportion of the total harm for which he is himself responsible. For harms that are incapable of
apportionment, see § 875.
Id. cmt. a.
35. Several liability is defined as "[Il]iability that is separate and distinct from another's liability, so that the
plaintiff may bring a separate action against one defendant without joining the other liable parties." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 933.
36. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. This general statement must allow for the fact that the original
tortfeasor may be held liable for the entire harm under a proximate cause analysis. See Payne v. Hall (Payne 1),
2004-NMCA-1 13, -H 36-37, 98 P.3d 1030, 1041 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
37. See infra Part VI.A.
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This framework presents an overview of multiple tortfeasor law, and these
patterns were firmly entrenched in New Mexico courts until 1981. The following
section will explore how the abrupt change from contributory negligence to
comparative negligence in 1981 inspired the courts to explore and change their
approach to multi-tortfeasor liability.38 Eventually, this evolution led to a complete
reversal of the traditional apportionment patterns in New Mexico.39
A. The Adoption of Comparative Negligence and Several Liability in New Mexico
Before 1981, New Mexico courts applied joint and several liability to concurrent
tortfeasors and several liability to successive tortfeasors.4° In addition, the courts
employed the doctrine of contributory negligence in tort actions, which prevented
a plaintiff from recovering monetary damages if the plaintiff's own negligence,
however slight, contributed to her injury.4 However, in the 1981 case of Scott v.
Rizzo,42 the New Mexico Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of contributory
negligence and adopted comparative negligence in its place.43 This change prompted
New Mexico courts to reevaluate multi-tortfeasor liability, eventually leading to a
complete reversal of the apportionment theories.
After Scott, the new comparative negligence approach allowed a plaintiff to
recover damages even if she contributed to her own injury.' Instead of a wholesale
rejection of the plaintiff s claim, the total damage award is merely reduced based on
the plaintiffs own percentage of fault in causing the injury.45 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals explained that comparative negligence seeks to accomplish "the
apportionment of fault between or among negligent parties.. .and apportionment of
the total damages resulting from such loss or injury in proportion to the fault of each
party."'
The following year, in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. ,47 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals began to apply comparative negligence to suits involving
multiple tortfeasors.18 In Bartlett, the plaintiff was injured in a three-vehicle
accident.49 The identity of one of the drivers was wholly unknown and the plaintiff
38. See infra Part I.A.
39. See infra Part .C.
40. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
41. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 684, 634 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1981). Under contributory negligence, a
defendant has a complete defense if he can establish that the plaintiff negligently contributed to her own injury. See
id.
42. Id.
43. See id.; see also Occhialino, supra note 1, at 4.
44. See Scott, 96 N.M. at 684 n.1, 634 P.2d at 1236 n.l; Occhialino, supra note I, at 4.
45. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 15, at 300.
46. Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 159, 646 P.2d 579, 586 (Ct. App. 1982).
47. Id.
48. In Bartlett, the New Mexico Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether it was appropriate for the
factfinder to determine the percentage of fault for an unknown concurrent tortfeasor and ultimately whether it was
appropriate to apply joint and several liability to a single, concurrent tortfeasor in a pure comparative negligence
system. See id. at 153-54, 646 P.2d at 580-81.
49. Id. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580. Three vehicles were driving in a single-file line, with the plaintiff driving
the middle car, when the lead car pulled off of and back on to the road very quickly. Id. The plaintiff slammed on
her brakes and the car behind her rear-ended her. Id.
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brought suit solely against the other, known driver."0 There was no question that the
defendant and the unknown driver were concurrent tortfeasors;5 1 instead, the court
was asked to decide whether it was appropriate, under the new comparative
negligence system, to apply joint and several liability to the known driver, thereby
making one concurrent tortfeasor liable for the entire injury.52
At trial, the jury determined that the plaintiff's damages totaled $100,000, and
that the defendant's negligence contributed to thirty percent of those damages. 3 If
the court of appeals chose to impose joint and several liability, the practical effect
would be that a defendant who was only thirty percent responsible for causing the
plaintiffs' injuries would be forced to pay one hundred percent of her damages.5
Instead, the court believed that it was no longer consistent to place full liability on
a single defendant when multiple parties combined to cause the injury.55 The court
stated that the jury is capable of apportioning comparative fault between a plaintiff
and a defendant in a traditional negligence action and, therefore, the jury is also
capable of apportioning fault among several defendants in a concurrent tort action. 6
This finding led the court of appeals to abolish joint and several liability for
concurrent tortfeasors
By adopting comparative fault (and several liability) for concurrent tortfeasors,
the Bartlett decision had two primary effects on concurrent tort actions. First,
Bartlett effectively held that no single defendant will be liable for the entirety of the
plaintiff's damages when multiple parties cause an indivisible injury to a plaintiff.58
Instead, each concurrent tortfeasor is severally responsible for his individual
50. Id. The driver of the lead car was unknown, and the plaintiff brought suit only against the driver of the
car that rear-ended her. Id.
51. See id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581. In other words, the drivers caused a single, indivisible injury to the
plaintiff. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
52. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581. Until the decision in Bartlett, New Mexico courts regularly
applied joint and several liability to a single concurrent tortfeasor. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
Thus, the court in Bartlett revisited and examined longstanding tort principles in New Mexico.
53. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580. The jury also determined that the unknown driver caused
seventy percent of the plaintiffs' damages. Id. The plaintiff moved the court for judgment against the defendant for
the full $100,000 under a theory of joint and several liability. Id. Instead of granting the motion, the trial court
ordered a new trial. Id. The defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal. See id.
54. Id. at 154,646 P.2d at 581.
55. Id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585; see also Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 425, 902 P.2d
1025, 1028 (1995).
56. See Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585; see also Lujan, 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025.
57. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
58. See id. Instead, each defendant will only be responsible for the individual percentage of harm that he or
she specifically caused. Id. Using this analysis, the court of appeals ordered that the defendant in Bartlett was only
responsible for thirty percent of the plaintiff's total damages, or $30,000 of the $100,000 total. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d
at 586. Additionally, one year after Bartlett, the court of appeals decided Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M.
742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983). Duran, like Bartlett, involved a lawsuit following a car accident, but the cases
turned on different theories of liability: the plaintiffs in Bartlett sued the defendant driver under a theory of
negligence, whereas the plaintiffs in Duran sued the auto manufacturer under a theory of strict products liability.
Duran, 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779. The court of appeals held that the concurrent tortfeasor concept was not
applicable because crashworthiness liability was based only on enhanced or additional injuries. Id. at 750, 688 P.2d
at 787. Duran illustrates that New Mexico courts had begun to adopt a distinction based on divisible injuries, rather
than a temporal relationship between the injuries. Id.
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percentage of fault.59 Therefore, the plaintiff must now join all of the tortfeasors that
contributed to her injury if she wishes to receive a full recovery. 6°
The second, indirect effect of the Bartlett decision is that concurrent tortfeasor
defendants may present evidence of comparative negligence at trial.6' Comparative
negligence allows the defendant to introduce evidence to show that the fault of
others contributed to the plaintiff's injury.62 If the defendant is successful, he will
reduce or eliminate his percentage of liability by attributing fault to other negligent
tortfeasors, thereby reducing his responsibility for damages. Consequently,
comparative fault creates a higher burden for the plaintiff by requiring the plaintiff
to identify and join all liable defendants to achieve a full recovery; failing full
joinder, the defendant will point to the fault of others to reduce his own liability and
the plaintiff risks an incomplete recovery.
B. Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico
The New Mexico Legislature incorporated the principles of Bartlett into the
Several Liability Act of 1986.63 The Act established several liability as the general
rule in tort actions, whereby each tortfeasor is only liable to the extent of his
individual fault.64 While the Several Liability Act did not overtly address the distinc-
tion between concurrent and successive tortfeasors, the New Mexico Legislature did
attempt to clarify an approach to multiple tortfeasor scenarios. 65 Akin to the
comparative fault principles in Bartlett, section (B) of the Several Liability Act
states that, when multiple defendants contribute to a single injury (i.e., concurrent
tortfeasors), each defendant is only liable for damages in an amount equal to that
defendant's individual percentage of fault in contributing to the injury.'
59. See Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585; Payne v. Hall (Payne 11), 2006-NMSC-029, 1 11, 137 P.3d
599, 603. In many ways, the Bartlett court created a legal fiction by asking the jury to divide and apportion an
indivisible injury. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court has also explained that "the jury assesses whether each
defendant's negligence is a cause of the plaintiff's harm and, if so, then the jury compares the negligence of each
tortfeasor in order to assign a percentage of fault." Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 35, 35 P.3d 972, 986.
Thus, the jury is not dividing the injury, but is apportioning percentages of negligence. See id.
60. See M.E. Occhialino, Bartlett Revisited: The Impact of Several Liability on Pretrial Procedure in New
Mexico-Part Two, 35 N.M. L. REv. 37, 39 (2005). Professor Occhialino states:
Several liability requires that the plaintiff engage in a different strategy: to obtain full recovery,
the plaintiff now must sue each tortfeasor. The plaintiff must try to identify all tortfeasors before
filing the lawsuit and must determine if one or more of them are jointly and severally liable for
all of the plaintiffs injuries pursuant to the exceptions to the general rule of several liability. If
no tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff usually should sue each identified
tortfeasor to assure full recovery.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Note that the defendant can accomplish this by joining other defendants into a single action, or by
using an "empty chair approach" without ever joining additional parties. See Martinez v. First Nat'l Bank of Santa
Fe, 107 N.M. 268, 270, 755 P.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Under comparative negligence, fault may be allocated
between defendant and a tortfeasor not joined as a party..., so long as evidence is presented to establish that the
absent party was negligent and fault can be fairly distributed in proportion to the injury caused by the act of each
joint tortfeasor."). For further discussion of the "empty chair approach," see Occhialino, supra note 60, at 63-64.
63. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987).
64. See id. § 41-3A-I(A); see also Occhialino, supra note 1, at 2.
65. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-I(D).
66. See id. § 41-3A-1(B). A further consequence of the Several Liability Act is that defendants are no longer
entitled to contribution. See id. Under several liability, defendants are only liable to the extent of their individual
Summer 2007]
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Conversely, section (D) of the Several Liability Act appears to address successive
tortfeasors by stating:67
Where a plaintiff sustains damage as the result of fault of more than one person
which can be causally apportioned on the basis that distinct harms were caused
to the plaintiff, the fault of each of the persons proximately causing one harm
shall not be compared to the fault of persons proximately causing other distinct
harms. Each person is severally liable only for the distinct harm which that
person proximately caused.68
Accordingly, section (D) indicates that the legislature intended for several liability
to apply in successive tortfeasor actions as well.6 9
In addition to establishing several liability as the default proposition in multiple
tortfeasor cases, the legislature followed Bartlett and expressly abolished joint and
several liability.7° Despite this general prohibition, the Several Liability Act carved
out four narrow exceptions where joint and several liability would still apply:7 (1)
intentional wrongs, (2) vicarious liability, (3) strict products liability, and (4) public
policy.72 However, subsequent case law in New Mexico has established another
specific exception where joint and several liability survives: successive tortfeasor
actions.73
Following the Several Liability Act, New Mexico courts have struggled with
when and how to apply joint and several liability in multiple tortfeasor cases.74
While both the courts and the legislature have expressed an intent to circumscribe
the use of joint and several liability, successive tortfeasor actions have broadened
its potential scope and application, and the following section will address this
progression.75
fault. Id. Consequently, there is no need for contribution. See, e.g., id.; Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 693,
712 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1985).
67. NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-l(D). Whereas Bartlett dealt with concurrent tortfeasors who had combined to
cause a single injury, section (D) references causally distinct harms, indicating that it applies to successive tortfeasor
scenarios. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. In addition, section (D) also expressly proscribes the use of comparative fault. See id. For a more
complete discussion of the Several Liability Act, see generally Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 24 (discussing the
legislative adoption of several liability in New Mexico).
70. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-l(A).
71. See id. § 41-3A-1(C).
72. Id. Section (C) reads:
The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(1) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage;
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person vicariously liable
for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed to those persons;
(3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective product, but only
to that portion of the total liability attributed to those persons; or
(4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a sound basis in public
policy.
Id. For a more complete discussion of the exceptions to several liability after the Act, see generally Occhialino,
supra note 1.
73. Payne v. Hall (Payne 11), 2006-NMSC-029, 13, 137 P.3d 599, 604; see also Occhialino, supra note
1, at 20-28.
74. See infra Part U.C.
75. See infra Part II.C; see also infra notes 283-285 and accompanying text.
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C. Successive Torifeasor Law After the Several Liability Act
New Mexico courts have not relied on the Several Liability Act for guidance in
successive tortfeasor cases, choosing instead to carve a path in common law.76 One
year after the Several Liability Act took effect, the court of appeals attempted to
apply comparative fault (and several liability) to successive tortfeasors in Martinez
v. First National Bank of Santa Fe.7 Whereas prior cases had addressed concurrent
tortfeasor actions involving a single injury,78 Martinez presented a classic successive
tortfeasor scenario when two tortfeasors caused separate and distinct injuries to the
plaintiff.79 Perhaps because the original tortfeasor was a family member, the
plaintiffs brought suit solely against the successive tortfeasor80
In Martinez, the court of appeals considered how to "apportion fault between the
tortfeasor who has created the plaintiff's injury and a subsequent tortfeasor who has
aggravated the original injury."8' The court suggested that fault should be
apportioned between the original and the successive tortfeasor to the extent that their
negligence was a proximate cause of each injury.82 Under this approach, the original
tortfeasor would be fully liable for the original injury; however, for the second
injury, the jury could compare the negligence of the original tortfeasor to that of the
successive tortfeasor and apportion liability between them. 3 The resulting
implication is that comparative fault and several liability apply to the second or
enhanced injury in successive tortfeasor actions."
Eight years later, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed successive tortfeasor
liability in Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp.85 In Lujan, the court
76. Only one New Mexico decision has directly cited to section (D) since the Several Liability Act took
effect in 1987. See Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972. In Lewis, the court ultimately determined that
the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof to show an enhanced injury, thereby making section 41-3A-I(D)
inapplicable. See id. U 34-35, 41, 35 P.3d at 986-87.
77. 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1987).
78. Id. at 270, 755 P.2d at 608.
79. Id. Stephen Martinez was originally injured after he was thrown from the bed of a pick-up truck driven
by his cousin and suffered a fractured dislocation of his elbow. Id. at 269, 755 P.2d at 607. Mr. Martinez was then
treated by Dr. Alkire, but the doctor failed to properly set and treat his fracture, which resulted in joint damage and
loss of the full use of his arm. Id. The plaintiffs sued the estate of Dr. Alkire for medical malpractice and, at trial,
the jury returned a special verdict that apportioned fault and damages among Mr. Martinez, Dr. Alkire, and Juan
Martinez (the driver), who was not a party to the action. Id. It was this special verdict that led the court of appeals
to reverse the trial court for error; Juan Martinez was never a party to the action and the court stated that it was a
reversible error to issue a judgment against him for damages. See id. at 271, 755 P.2d at 609.
80. Id. at 269, 755 P.2d at 607.
81. Id. at 270, 755 P.2d at 608. The court began by restating the basic principle that, "when the negligent
acts of more than one person combine to proximately cause an [indivisible] injury, it is a question of fact to
determine the amount or percentage of comparative negligence of each person." Id. (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M.
682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981)). The court further stated that "each tortfeasor is responsible only for his share of the
fault." Id. (citing Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983)).
82. Id.; see also Brady C. Pofahl, Note, Tort Law-Original and Successive Torrfeasors and Release
Documents in New Mexico Tort Law: Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corporation, 27 N.M. L. REv. 697, 697
(1997).
83. Martinez, 107 N.M. at 270, 755 P.2d at 608; see also Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422,
424, 902 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1995).
84. Martinez, 107 N.M. at 270, 755 P.2d at 608.
85. 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025. Lujan was factually similar to Martinez in that both plaintiffs sustained
fractures as a result of automobile accidents, both suffered enhanced injuries as a result of the subsequent medical
treatment they received, and both plaintiffs brought suit against the second or successive tortfeasor. See Lujan, 120
N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025; Martinez, 107 N.M. at 269, 755 P.2d at 607. However, Lujan was more procedurally
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reexamined and ultimately rejected the apportionment suggestions presented in
Martinez.86 Rather than employ several liability for the second injury, the court held
that either the original or the successive tortfeasor would be fully liable for the
second or enhanced injury, contingent only on whomever the plaintiff chooses to
pursue.87
The supreme court first explored the liability attached to the original tortfeasor
and concluded that an original tortfeasor, if sued alone, is jointly and severally liable
for the entire harm.88 Using a proximate cause analysis, the court held that the
original tortfeasor will be fully liable for both the original and the enhanced injuries
as long as the "'negligence of a [successive tortfeasor]...does not break the sequence
of events."' 89 The court further explained that, "premised upon the concept that the
original tort is a proximate cause of the [second tort], courts have held the original
tortfeasor liable both for the original injury and for the harm caused by [the
successive tortfeasor's negligence]." 9 Accordingly, the court determined that the
original tortfeasor would be jointly and severally liable for the entire harm based on
an analysis that examines both proximate cause and divisibility of the resultant
injuries.91
The court then turned to the successive tortfeasor and stated that, because the
harm is divisible into separate injuries, a successive tortfeasor "who negligently
aggravates the plaintiffs initial injuries is not jointly and severally liable for the
entire harm, but is [fully] liable.. .for the additional harm., 92 Therefore, even though
both the original and the successive tortfeasor were each a proximate cause of the
second injury,93 the successive tortfeasor could be jointly and severally liable for
that injury; as a practical matter, this meant that the plaintiff may choose to pursue
complex because the plaintiff had previously filed a separate suit against the original tortfeasor before filing suit
against Healthsouth (the successive tortfeasor) for the second injury. Lujan, 120 N.M. at 423, 902 P.2d at 1026. The
first suit settled and the plaintiff effectuated a general release of claims against all other parties "who together with
[the original tortfeasor] may be jointly or severally liable to [the plaintiff] for injuries arising out of the January 1990
accident." Id. at 424, 902 P.2d at 1027. The question on appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court was whether
Healthsouth, as a successive tortfeasor, could be jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's injuries such that the
release of claims against the original tortfeasor also included all claims against Healthsouth for the additional injury.
Id. Defendant Healthsouth argued that, after Martinez, any claim for damages against Healthsouth as a successive
tortfeasor would require the court to compare Healthsouth's negligence against that of the original tortfeasor to
determine appropriate portions of liability for the second injury. Id. at 424-25, 902 P.2d at 1027-28. This question
necessarily required the court to determine what type of liability attached to the successive tortfeasor for the
enhanced injury. Id. at 425, 902 P.2d at 1028.
86. Lujan, 120 N.M. at 426, 902 P.2d at 1029.
87. Id. at 426-27, 902 P.2d at 1029-30.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 426, 902 P.2d at 1029 (quoting Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 412, 285 P.2d 507, 514
(1955)). The court noted that,"[w]hen a person causes an injury to another which requires medical treatment, it is
foreseeable that the treatment, whether provided properly or negligently, will cause additional harm." Id. (citing Ash
v. Mortensen, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944)). This tends to indicate that injuries resulting from subsequent medical
treatment are always foreseeable, and proximate causation is therefore established automatically. See id.
90. Id. The court was careful to note, however, that "[e]ven though the original tortfeasor may be held liable
for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original
tortfeasor...can shift through indemnification the responsibility for an enhanced injury." Id. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030.
91. Id. The court was silent, however, on whether the original tortfeasor may still be jointly and severally
liable for the entire harm in the absence of proximate causation. Id.
92. Id. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030 (emphasis added).
93. Both the original tortfeasor and the successive tortfeasor are proximate causes of the second injury. Id.
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the successive tortfeasor alone for the full extent of the second injury.94 This holding
effectively rejected the New Mexico Court of Appeals' rationale in Martinez by
stating that principles of comparative negligence do not apply to the second injury
in successive tortfeasor actions. 95
Six years later, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed and further clarified its
holding in Lujan when it decided Lewis v. Samson.96 Like Lujan, Lewis was a
successive tortfeasor case where the plaintiff brought suit against the successive
tortfeasor alone.97 Lewis, however, limited the application of Lujan to a narrow class
of cases where an original tortfeasor causes an initial injury, followed by a distinct
enhancement of that injury resulting from subsequent, negligent medical treatment.98
The supreme court began its analysis in Lewis by affirming the apportionment
principles set forth in Lujan.99 Beginning with the original tortfeasor, the court
reiterated Lujan's proximate cause analysis by stating that the original tortfeasor, if
sued alone, "is jointly and severally liable for the entire harm to the plaintiff,
including the original injury and any foreseeable enhancement of the injury."'°
Turning to the successive tortfeasor, the court echoed Lujan and stated that the
successive tortfeasor, if sued alone, is fully liable for the second or enhanced
injury."t ' In either scenario, however, the court stated that the plaintiff is required
to prove the existence of a separate or enhanced injury as well as the degree of
enhancement in order for joint and several liability to apply. °2 Failing proof of a
distinct second injury, the court stated that the original tortfeasor remains liable for
the entire harm. °3
94. Id. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030; see also Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 31, 35 P.3d 972, 984.
95. Lujan, 120 N.M. at 425, 902 P.2d at 1028; see also Lewis, 2001-NMSC-035, 31, 35 P.3d at 984;
Pofahl, supra note 82, at 697.
96. 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972. The year before Lewis was decided, the Restatement (Third) of Torts also
addressed the issue of concurrent and successive tortfeasors. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 (2000). like Lujan and Lewis, the Restatement (Third) of Torts also determined
liability for each tortfeasor based on the presence, or lack, of causally divisible injuries. Id. § 26.
97. See Lujan, 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025; Lewis, 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972. In Lewis, the plaintiff
was the personal representative for a victim who had been stabbed repeatedly before receiving treatment at an
emergency room. Lewis, 2001-NMSC-035, 3, 35 P.3d at 975. The doctors did what they could but waited for an
expert surgeon to arrive before beginning an advanced procedure. Id. The victim died following surgery. See id. At
trial, the plaintiff argued that the decedent would have lived but for the doctors' negligent treatment; in return, the
doctors argued that the stab wounds caused by the original tortfeasor were responsible for the decedent's death and
that their treatment did nothing to enhance or aggravate the victim's already fatal injuries. Id. 136, 35 P.3d at 986.
The jury found by special verdict that the defendant doctors were not negligent. Id. 131 n.2, 35 P.3d at 984 n.2.
98. Lewis, 2001-NMSC-035, 1 34, 35 P.3d at 985.
99. Id. 9H 31-36, 35 P.3d at 984-86.
100. Id. 1 33, 35 P.3d at 985 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy, however, that the Lewis court was
unwillingly to automatically apply joint and several liability as a matter of law; rather, the application of joint and
several liability was contingent upon proximate causation where the causal chain remained unbroken between the
first and the second injuries. Id. 33 n.4, 35 P.3d at 985 n.4. Where the injuries caused by the successive tortfeasor's
negligence "are so remote from the original injury as to be unforeseeable," the court indicated that it would be
improper to impose joint and several liability on the original tortfeasor as a matter of law; instead, the original
tortfeasor's liability would be limited to the original injury alone. Id.
101. Id. 36, 35 P.3d at 986.
102. Id.
103. Id. 1 34, 35 P.3d at 985-86. This statement is counterintuitive because if the injury is indivisible, then
the tortfeasors should be considered concurrent and the original tortfeasor, instead of being liable for the entire
injury, should be allowed to argue comparative fault to offset some of the liability onto the successive tortfeasor.
Id. 1 37, 35 P.3d at 986.
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After summarizing and clarifying the Lujan holding, the court turned to the more
problematic issue of when and how comparative fault may be introduced at trial. 04
The court began by stating that, in a successive tortfeasor case, "a jury does not
compare the negligence of the tortfeasors for the [second] injury, but the plaintiff
must still prove that the [successive tortfeasor' s] negligence proximately caused an
enhancement of the initial harm suffered at the hands of the original tortfeasor."'' 5
Once the plaintiff has established two separate injuries, the defendant may not then
compare his fault with the other tortfeasor to reduce his liability for the second
injury.' 06 However, when the injury is not clearly divisible, a successive tortfeasor
defendant may argue, as an affirmative defense, that the original tortfeasor was the
proximate cause of the entire harm or, stated differently, the successive tortfeasor
did not cause any appreciable second injury.' 7 Without a distinct second injury, the
successive tortfeasor removes his liability entirely and the original tortfeasor
remains fully liable for the entire harm.'0 8
Lujan and Lewis represent the working rules for successive tortfeasor actions at
the time Payne v. Hall was decided. Following Lewis and Lujan, it was unclear
whether the original tortfeasor would always be jointly and severally liable for the
second injury and whether these cases limited joint and several liability to situations
where the second injury was caused by medical negligence.' °9 Further, there was
continued ambiguity as to when and how comparative fault may be presented at
trial, particularly where the injury is not clearly divisible. Finally, there was no
guidance on how to apportion fault when the plaintiff brings suit against both the
original and successive tortfeasor in the same action. These questions remained
unanswered at the time Payne v. Hall was decided in 2006.
Il. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Payne v. Hall was the first case to reach the New Mexico Supreme Court where
the plaintiff brought suit solely against the original tortfeasor." ° The plaintiffs
injuries, however, were not clearly divisible and the court struggled with how to
104. Id. 1 35-37, 35 P.3d at 986.
105. Id. 135, 35 P.3d at 986 (citing Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 426, 902 P.2d 1025,
1029 (1995)).
106. Id.
107. Id. 37, 35 P.3d at 986 ("[A] physician accused of subsequent medical negligence may rebut the
plaintiff's evidence of causation through evidence of the initial tortfeasor's responsibility for the entire harm."). A
successful argument would aim to establish that the successive tortfeasor may have been negligent, but his
negligence did not cause any appreciably distinct injury. Id. 1 33, 35 P.3d at 985. In Lewis, the defendant doctor
argued that stab wounds caused by the original tortfeasor were the sole cause of the victim's death. Id. 1 36, 35 P.3d
at 986.
108. Id. Although the court held that a defendant may introduce evidence of the other tortfeasor's fault in
causing the entirety of the injury, Lewis held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on comparative fault
for two reasons. Id. 41, 35 P.3d at 987-88. First, the court believed that a comparative fault instruction
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof for the enhanced injury from the plaintiff to the defendant. Id. Second,
assuming that the plaintiff had met her burden to prove an enhanced injury and the degree of enhancement, the court
believed that a comparative fault instruction was improper because the defendants would have been liable for the
entirety of the enhanced injury and any apportionment of fault by the jury would have been improper. Id. 9141, 35
P.3d at 988. Regardless of these errors, the court held that the improper instruction did not prejudice the plaintiff
and reinstated a judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. 9 44-45, 35 P.3d at 988-89.
109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110. Payne v. Hall (Payne I1), 2006-NMSC-029, 137 P.3d 599.
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apportion fault. Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Bosson examined the
plaintiffs burden to prove causally divisible injuries and when the court may
appropriately assign negligence for the injuries as a matter of law."' After outlining
a clear framework for apportionment, the court suggested a variety of ways to
approach successive tortfeasor actions and methods to improve trial procedure." 2
A. Facts of the Case
Payne v. Hall originated from complications during an elective abortion
performed on Kimberly J. Payne that resulted in the loss of her uterus and right
kidney.' Ms. Payne was four months pregnant when she chose to have an
abortion.' Because New Mexico hospitals refuse to admit patients directly for
elective abortions, it was necessary for Ms. Payne to go to a clinic for the
procedure." 5 Her physician referred her to the Boyd Clinic (Clinic), where she first
met with Dr. Hall."
16
The Clinic used a two-day procedure, known as a dilation and extraction, due to
the advanced stage of Ms. Payne's pregnancy." 7 Ms. Payne experienced some initial
pain and discomfort on the first day of the procedure but elected to continue."' On
the second day, she returned to the Clinic to complete the abortion,' 9 but she had
difficulty tolerating the pain of the procedure.' 20 Dr. Hall ultimately determined that
he could not complete the abortion at the Clinic, and because the procedure was too
far along to stop, Dr. Hall decided to transfer Ms. Payne to the University of New
Mexico Hospital (Hospital) to complete the procedure.' 2'
111. See infra Part IV.B.
112. See infra Part IV.C-D.
113. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 3, 137 P.3d at 602.
114. Id. Ms. Payne was in her second trimester of pregnancy. Id.; see also Payne v. Hall (Payne 1), 2004-
NMCA-113, 2,98P.3d 1030, 1033.
115. Payne 1I, 2006-NMSC-029,1 5, 137 P.3d at 602.
116. Id. 1 1, 137 P.3d at 602; Payne 1, 2004-NMCA-113, 2, 98 P.3d at 1033. Dr. Hall was the named
defendant in this case.
117. Payne I, 2006-NMSC-029, 3, 137 P.3d at 602. In a dilation and extraction (D&E), the cervix is dilated
on the first day and the fetus is removed on the second. Id. After Ms. Payne completed the background procedures,
including a medical history, Dr. Hall began the dilation portion of the procedure. Payne I, 2004-NMCA-1 13, 2,
98 P.3d at 1033.
118. Payne I, 2004-NMCA-113, 2,98 P.3d at 1033.
119. Id. Before beginning the extraction, Dr. Hall tried unsuccessfully to start an IV in Ms. Payne's arms to
help with pain relief. Id. 3, 98 P.3d at 1033. There was a question at trial of whether Ms. Payne was a past or
present IV drug user and whether Dr. Hall's inability to start an IV was directly caused by her prior drug use. Id.
After determining that an IV was not possible, the Clinic staff attempted to call in an anesthesiologist. Id. When they
could not locate one, Dr. Hall presented Ms. Payne with two options: First, Dr. Hall could perform the procedure
at the Clinic using an intramuscular anesthesia, which may increase the risk of bleeding without IV access and
would require transferring Ms. Payne to a hospital if she had excessive bleeding or was unable to tolerate the pain.
Id. Alternatively, Dr. Hall stated that he could immediately transfer Ms. Payne to a hospital where another doctor
would perform the entire procedure. Id. Ms. Payne elected to stay at the Clinic to undergo the remaining procedure.
Id.
120. Id. 14, 98 P.3d at 1033. Ms. Payne "had a hard time staying still, was in a significant amount of distress,
began experiencing a lot of pain, and was screaming and moving her legs and body off the table." Id. 1 4, 98 P.3d
at 1033. After initially agreeing to continue the procedure, Ms. Payne asked Dr. Hall to stop the procedure several
times. Id. I 4-5, 98 P.3d at 1033-34.
121. Payne I1, 2006-NMSC-029,1 5, 137 P.3d at 602.
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While at the Hospital, Dr. Maybach, a second-year resident, continued the
procedure under the supervision of Dr. Jamison.'22 As Dr. Maybach attempted to
remove the fetus, she caused extensive damage, including the mistaken removal of
Ms. Payne's right ureter 123 and, later, the accidental extraction of her right ovary. 24
During surgery, the doctors found that Ms. Payne's uterus was perforated beyond
repair and they were forced to perform a hysterectomy; later, after they discovered
the missing ureter, they were also forced to remove her right kidney. 121
B. Procedural Posture
Following the surgery, Ms. Payne filed suit against Dr. Hall and the Boyd Clinic
under the theory of successive tortfeasor liability and sought to hold the Clinic
jointly and severally liable for the entirety of her injuries at both the Clinic and the
Hospital. 2 6 At trial, Ms. Payne argued that her uterus was perforated at the Clinic,
which then necessitated her transfer to the Hospital. 127 She contended that the Clinic,
in causing that original injury, was also responsible for the additional harm that
occurred later at the Hospital. 2 ' In response, the Clinic denied any negligence and
averred that "it caused no separate injury to [Ms. Payne], but that all injuries resulted
at the Hospital."'
129
At trial, and at Ms. Payne's request, the court instructed the jury that Ms. Payne
had the burden of proving that the Clinic's negligence was the proximate cause of
her injuries. 3 The court then gave the jury a special verdict form that separated
negligence from proximate cause.' 31 The jury returned a verdict that found the Clinic
negligent but also found that the Clinic's negligence was not a proximate cause of
122. Id. 6, 137 P.3d at 602.
123. Id. The ureter is the tube that connects the kidney to the bladder. Id.
124. Payne 1, 2004-NMCA-113, 8, 98 P.3d at 1034. When the doctors saw the plaintiffs ovary among the
extracted tissue, they stopped the abortion and began emergency abdominal surgery. Id. IN 8-9, 98 P.3d at 1034.
125. Id. 9, 98 P.3d at 1034-35.
126. Id. 10, 98 P.3d at 1035. Initially, the defendants filed a third-party complaint seeking indemnity from
the Hospital. Id. However, the third-party complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the two-year
limitations period under the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977). See Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029,
7 n.2, 137 P.3d at 602 n.2.
127. Payne 1, 2004-NMCA-113, 6, 98 P.3d at 1034.
128. Id. 1 10, 98 P.3d at 1035; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text. If the Clinic were found liable
as the original tortfeasor, joint and several liability would apply and the Clinic would be responsible for all damages
caused in the course of the abortion. Payne 1I, 2006-NMSC-029, 7, 137 P.3d at 602.
129. Payne 1I, 2006-NMSC-029, 17, 137 P.3d at 605. While Dr. Hall wrote in his operative report that he
"strongly suspect[ed] possible perforation," he testified at trial that he did not believe that he had caused a
perforation while Ms. Payne was at the Clinic. Payne I, 2004-NMCA- 113, 6-7, 98 P.3d at 1034. Dr. Hall
presented evidence that Ms. Payne had stable vital signs when she arrived at the Hospital and that there was no
obvious evidence of a perforation. Id. 1 7, 98 P.3d at 1034. Dr. Jamison also testified at trial and stated that she
would not have allowed Dr. Maybach to perform the procedure if she had suspected that Dr. Hall had perforated
the uterus. Id. 8, 98 P.3d at 1034.
130. Payne 1I, 2006-NMSC-029, 9, 137 P.3d at 603. The jury also received a separate instruction that
"[wihen a person causes an injury to another which requires medical treatment, it is foreseeable that the treatment,
whether provided properly or negligently, will cause additional harm. Therefore, the person causing the original
injury is also liable for the additional injury caused by subsequent medical treatment, if any." Id. 8, 137 P.3d at
603.
131. Id. 9, 137 P.3d at 603. The proximate cause instruction was removed from the New Mexico Uniform
Jury Instructions after the original trial. Id.
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Ms. Payne's injuries. 3 2 Without causation, the Clinic could not be held liable for
Ms. Payne's injuries and her claim became a nullity.'33
After the verdict was issued, Ms. Payne requested a new trial and a Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV),'34 asking the court to find, as a matter of law,
that the Clinic was the proximate cause of her subsequent injuries at the Hospital. 35
Ms. Payne argued, in light of Lewis, that "an original tortfeasor's negligence is, as
a matter of law, the sole proximate cause" of both the original and the enhanced
injuries. 36 The trial court denied her motions, and she appealed the ruling. 37
When the case first reached the New Mexico Court of Appeals, the court initially
certified the successive tortfeasor issues to the New Mexico Supreme Court. 138 At
that time, the New Mexico Supreme Court was addressing successive tortfeasor
issues in Lewis v. Samson. 139 The supreme court granted but later quashed certiorari
after issuing a final decision in Lewis.'" The court of appeals then asked the parties
to brief their positions in light of the Lewis decision. 4'
On appeal, Ms. Payne renewed her argument that the Clinic was fully liable for
the entirety of her injuries as a matter of law. In a split decision written by Judge
Castillo, the court of appeals rejected this argument and upheld both the jury's
verdict and the district court's decision to deny her motion for a JNOV. 4 2 The court
found that Ms. Payne had not proved that the Clinic caused any original injury and,
therefore, had not met her burden of proof at trial.
14 3
Ms. Payne then argued that the trial court erred in allowing the Clinic to argue
comparative fault at trial (i.e., that the Hospital was the singular cause of all of Ms.
Payne's injuries).'" The court affirmed that "the argument that another tortfeasor
was wholly responsible [for all of the injuries] represents a basic proximate cause
defense."' 45 Accordingly, the court concluded that an original tortfeasor is entitled
to argue, as an affirmative defense, that it did not cause any original injury and that
the successive tortfeasor is the sole proximate cause of the entire harm. 46 As a
result, the court believed that the jury instructions, which included comparative fault
132. Id. 10, 137 P.3d at 603. Although the jury was not asked to decide this issue, it is possible they believed
that the Clinic was not responsible for any injuries that occurred at the Hospital.
133. Id.146, 137 P.3d at 610.
134. A Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is defined as "[a] judgment entered for one party even though
a jury verdict has been rendered for the opposing party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 860.
135. Payne 1I, 2006-NMSC-029, 10, 137 P.3d at 603.
136. Payne v. Hall (Payne 1), 2004-NMCA- 113, 14, 98 P.3d 1030, 1036.
137. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 10, 137 P.3d at 603.
138. Payne I, 2004-NMCA-113, 11, 98 P.3d at 1035.
139. See id. (citing Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 10, 137 P.3d at 603.
143. Payne I, 2004-NMCA- 113, 15, 98 P.3d at 1036.
144. Id. 1 13, 98 P.3d at 1035-36. At trial, the Clinic successfully argued that the Hospital was the sole
proximate cause of Ms. Payne's injuries and that any and all injuries to Ms. Payne occurred at the Hospital. Id.
145. Id. [ 29, 98 P.3d at 1039. The court held that an original tortfeasor "may argue that any negligence that
may have occurred is not necessarily the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by [the] Plaintiff." Id. 22, 98 P.3d
at 1038.
146. Id. 29, 98 P.3d at 1039.
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language, did not cause any additional confusion and were therefore not in error. 47
Ms. Payne appealed again, and the New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari
on June 13, 2005.148
IV. RATIONALE
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to "clarify the evolving state
of the law regarding successive tortfeasor liability, particularly as it relates to the
requirement that the victim prove a distinct injury caused by the negligence of the
original tortfeasor, separate and apart from those injuries later caused by the
successive tortfeasor."' 49 Although the supreme court rarely hears successive
tortfeasor cases, those disputes that had reached the supreme court were increasingly
problematic. 50 Payne 11 presented the supreme court with the opportunity to clarify
a system that was not, according to Judge Alarid, "'capable of being understood and
applied by courts and juries in a reasonably efficient manner.""'' . Moreover, Payne
1I allowed the court to apply the theoretical implications in Lujan and Lewis to an
original tortfeasor for the first time.'52
A. Successive Tortfeasors and the Requirement of a Causally Distinct Injury
The court began its analysis by differentiating between the liability for concurrent
and successive tortfeasors.' The court noted that, even though several liability is
the general rule in New Mexico, there are narrow exceptions that still allow forjoint
and several liability. I4 Although these exceptions are listed in section 41-3A- 1(C)
of the New Mexico statutes, the supreme court chose instead to focus on the
common law development of joint and several liability following the Act."'
147. Id. 1 30, 98 P.3d at 1040. Judge Alarid wrote a special concurrence to the court of appeals decision
because he believed that it was an error to focus on divisible injuries and suggested that the court should simply
focus on causation. Id. 1135-37,98 P.3d at 1041 (Alarid, J., specially concurring). Under this approach, the plaintiff
would not be required to show an enhanced injury and the degree of enhancement; rather, the plaintiff need only
show that the original tortfeasor was negligent and that during the causal chain of events the plaintiff was injured.
Id. 37, 98 P.3d at 1041. Accordingly, Judge Alarid stated that an original injury is relevant rather than
determinative because "it is the reason the plaintiff goes to the hospital." Id. Judge Alarid still believed that an
original tortfeasor could be jointly and severally liable for the entire harm, even without causally divisible injuries,
as long as the original tortfeasor's negligence caused the plaintiff's exposure to malpractice. Id. However, the
reciprocal effect is that the original tortfeasor is not automatically jointly and severally liable for the second injury.
Id.
148. Payne I, 2004-NMCA-1 13,98 P.3d 1030, cert. granted, 2004-NMCERT-010, 101 P.3d 808.
149. Payne v. Hall (Payne Ii), 2006-NMSC-029, 1 2, 137 P.3d 599, 602.
150. See supra Part II.C.
151. Payne I, 2004-NMCA-I13, 48, 98 P.3d 1030, 1043 (Alarid, J., specially concurring) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LABILITY § 26 cmt. a (2000)).
152. See generally Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 137 P.3d 599 (discussing the application of joint and several
liability to an original tortfeasor and the requisite burden of proof).
153. Id. in 11-12, 137 P.3d at 603. The court stated that concurrent tortfeasors are subject to several liability
when they cause a single, indivisible injury. Id. 1 11, 137 P.3d at 603. Under the general rule of several liability,
the court affirmed that "each tortfeasor is severally responsible for its own percentage of comparative fault for that
injury." Id.
154. See id. 1 11-13, 137 P.3d at 604. The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that, "[u]nder the theory of
joint and several liability, each tortfeasor is liable for the entire injury, regardless of proportional fault, leaving it
to the defendants to sort out among themselves individual responsibility based on theories of proportional
indemnification or contribution." Id. I 11, 137 P.3d at 604.
155. See id. 11 12-13, 137 P.3d at 604.
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Affirming Lujan, the court stated that "the successive tortfeasor doctrine imposes
joint and several liability on the original tortfeasor for the full extent of both
injuries."' 5 6 Conversely, "[t]he successive tortfeasor is only responsible for the
second injury or for the distinct enhancement of the first injury."' 57
Despite the court's affirmation that successive tortfeasor actions may present an
additional area where joint and several liability survives, the court stated its intent
to limit joint and several liability to "'a narrow class of cases,' in which a plaintiff
can show more than one distinct injury."' 8 In looking at the divisibility of the
injury, the court was careful to state that tortfeasors were not successive merely
because of their linear or temporal relationship." 9 Rather, the court held that the
proper distinction between concurrent and successive tortfeasors was based on an
original injury and a subsequent or enhanced second injury. " Thus, the court firmly
established that the injury, or rather, the presence of two distinct injuries, is the
determinative factor in whether tortfeasors are concurrent or successive.'6 ' In the
absence of distinctly divisible injuries, the court held that the tortfeasors are deemed
concurrent and are subject to several liability. 162
B. Standard of Proof
After analyzing the framework for apportionment in successive tortfeasor actions,
the supreme court then addressed the requisite standard of proof. 163 The court stated
that generally, where a plaintiff seeks to obtain joint and several liability against an
original tortfeasor, the plaintiff not only bears the burden to prove the presence of
divisible injuries, but must also prove negligence and causation."6 The court then
156. Id. 7 13, 137 P.3d at 604 (emphasis added).
157. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 34, 35 P.3d 972, 985-86). Whereas
joint and several liability historically applied to either party that combined to cause an injury, the court in Payne
II limited joint and several liability to the party that causes the first injury (the original tortfeasor). Id. The successive
tortfeasor is not subject to joint and several liability for the entire injury; however, the successive tortfeasor is fully
liable for the second or enhanced injury. See supra Part I.C. Generally, this distinction is only necessary to show
that the successive tortfeasor will never be liable for the original injury. See Payne 1I, 2006-NMSC-029, 13, 137
P.3d at 604.
158. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 14, 137 P.3d at 604 (quoting Lewis, 2001-NMSC-035, 32, 35 P.3d at
984). In addition, there is an implicit intent in Payne 1I to limit joint and several liability to cases where the second
injury is caused by medical negligence. See id. 28, 137 P.3d at 607 ("[S]uccessive tortfeasor liability applies only
when an original injury causes subsequent medical treatment.....
159. Id. 15, 137 P.3d at 604.
160. Id. The court restated the general rule in Lujan that
concurrent tortfeasors cause a single, indivisible injury [whereas] successive tortfeasors cause
separate, divisible injuries. Under successive tortfeasor liability, a first injury is caused by an
original tortfeasor. That injury then causally leads to a second distinct injury, or a distinct
enhancement of the first injury, caused by a successive tortfeasor.
Id. 12, 137 P.3d at 604.
161. If there is only one indivisible injury, then the tortfeasors are concurrent; if there are two or more
separate and divisible injuries, caused by separate individuals, then the tortfeasors are successive. See supra Part
H.A.
162. Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029, 12, 137 P.3d at 604.
163. Id. 28-29, 137 P.3d at 607.
164. Id. N 15, 29, 137 P.3d at 604-05,607. While the court essentially adopted the Lewis approach, the court
was silent on whether the plaintiff was still required to prove the degree of enhancement for the second injury. Id.
U 11, 19, 137 P.3d at 603--04, 605. The court required a plaintiff to "show that 'the original injury and the
subsequent enhancement of that injury [are] separate and causally-distinct' before joint and several liability would
Summer 2007]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
evaluated the facts on appeal in light of these three elements to determine whether
Ms. Payne had met her burden of proof.'65
Based on the jury's conclusions, the court surmised that Ms. Payne "met part of
her burden by proving negligence, but failed to show the Clinic's negligence caused
any distinct original injury"'" such as a perforated uterus, internal bleeding, or pain
and suffering. 167 Ms. Payne contended that a finding of negligence was sufficient to
impose causation as a matter of law. 168 However, the court rejected this argument
and held that "[c]ausation for the second injury is determined as a matter of law, but
if, and only if, the plaintiff satisfactorily demonstrates that the original tortfeasor
negligently caused a distinct, original injury requiring medical treatment."' 169 It was
disputed at trial whether the Clinic had caused any original injury, and the court
determined that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the Clinic's
negligence did not result in a distinct original injury.170 Failing this proof, the court
declined to impose causation as a matter of law.'
17
Ms. Payne's second argument suggested that successive tortfeasor liability should
be based on a mere causal connection between the negligence and the injury, rather
than requiring proof of two causally distinct injuries.172 As an affirmative matter, the
court recognized that there are many situations where a defendant's negligence,
without causing a distinct original injury, may cause a person to seek medical
care. 17 3 The court agreed that, in such situations, the defendant's negligence is
arguably a contributing factor to any resulting injury caused by medical
negligence. 174 However, the court rejected the plaintiff's proposition that causation
was sufficient to impose liability in the absence of distinct injuries and reaffirmed
that successive tortfeasor liability applies "only when an original injury causes
subsequent medical treatment, because it is that separate injury which makes
subsequent medical treatment foreseeable as a matter of law."'175 The court
concluded its analysis by stating that "[w]ithout a separate original injury, there is
but one injury caused by the combined negligence of two tortfeasors. This would be
apply. Id. 14, 137 P.3d at 604 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab.
Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 426, 902 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1995)). However, the court stated that "[mierely alleging a causal
connection between two alleged tortfeasors who cause a single, indivisible injury does not meet this requirement."
Id. 29, 137 P.3d at 607. This language illustrates the court's focus on the injury as the determinative factor in
whether liability will be joint and several or merely several. Id.
165. Id. 19, 137 P.3d at 605.
166. Id.
167. Id. 1 16, 137 P.3d at 605. The court stated that "[wihen the claim is brought against the original
tortfeasor, it is up to the plaintiff to prove, and the jury to decide, whether the plaintiff suffered a distinct original
injury caused by the original tortfeasor's negligence." Id. 1 19, 137 P.3d at 605.
168. Id. 18, 137 P.3d at 605.
169. Id. 19, 137 P.3d at 605. The court further stated that "[i]f the original tortfeasor causes a distinct
original injury requiring medical treatment, then it is also the cause, as a matter of law, for the successive injury."
Id. 1 33 n.4, 137 P.3d at 608 n.4.
170. Id. 25, 137 P.3d at 606.
171. See id.
172. Id. (H 26-27, 137 P.3d at 606-07. The New Mexico Supreme Court's argument here addresses Judge
Alarid's special concurrence in the court of appeal's decision. See supra note 147.
173. Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029, 28, 137 P.3d at 607.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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a classic comparative negligence case arising from concurrent tortfeasors who
together produce one, indivisible injury."' 176
C. Uniform Jury Instructions and Comparative Fault
Although the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof, the court felt compelled
to assess whether the jury instructions given at trial allowed the jury to decide the
essential issues of the case. 17 7 The court believed that the jury was never asked the
determinative question of whether the Clinic's negligence caused a separate original
injury, causally distinct from those occurring at the Hospital. 78 Instead, "the jury
was asked about the causation of injuries considered as a whole,' 179 and whether the
Clinic's negligence "was a proximate cause of the injuries and damages [sustained
by the plaintiff]."'80
The court found a fatal problem with this definition of proximate cause because
it failed to "differentiat[e] between the original injury and the successive injury." '181
The court stated, "Based on the given instructions, the jury could well have
concluded that it had to determine whether the Clinic's negligence caused all the
injuries, both those occurring at the Clinic and those occurring at the Hospital."'8'2
As a result, the court questioned the jury's conclusions because it was unclear
whether the jury had addressed the "pivotal and determinative issue of the case."'83
The court also considered whether the trial court properly permitted the Clinic to
introduce, and the jury to hear, evidence that Ms. Payne's injuries were solely
caused by the Hospital.' 8' Ms. Payne contended that it was an error to allow the
Clinic to argue comparative fault in a successive tortfeasor action. 185 The court
disagreed, stating, "Under the law of this state, the alleged original tortfeasor may
argue that another tortfeasor caused the original injury; in other words, that the
original tortfeasor's negligence did not cause an original distinct injury. Such an
argument is not comparative fault but a basic proximate cause defense."''8 6
Under this approach, when the divisibility of the plaintiff's injury is in dispute,
the court will allow the original tortfeasor to argue that he did not cause any
appreciable first injury. 187 The court was careful to distinguish, however, that when
divisible injuries are clearly present, comparative fault should not be argued because
the original tortfeasor, if liable for an initial injury, is also liable as a matter of law
for the second injury. 88 Therefore, the original tortfeasor may not introduce
176. Id.
177. See id. 131, 137 P.3d at 607-08.
178. Id. 35, 137 P.3d at 609.
179. Id. 33, 137 P.3d at 609 (emphasis added). Note that this was, in part, the fault of the plaintiff, who
selected the specific instructions presented to the jury, along with the special verdict form. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. 35, 137 P.3d at 608-09.
183. Id. 36, 137 P.3d at 609.
184. Id. 33 n.4, 137 P.3d at 608 n.4.
185. Id.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. See id.
188. Id. Essentially, this holding reaffirms that joint and several liability will attach to the original tortfeasor
upon a determination that divisible injuries are present. Id.
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evidence of the successive tortfeasor's negligence in an attempt to reduce his
liability for the second injury.'89 The court further indicated that the current Uniform
Jury Instructions do not adequately or accurately relate to successive tortfeasor
situations and suggested that future modifications were necessary to address causally
divisible injuries.' 90
D. Guidance for Future Successive Tortfeasor Actions
Perhaps anticipating difficulty in working through future multi-tortfeasor
scenarios after untangling the issues in Payne, the court provided guidance on how
successive tortfeasor actions should proceed at trial to avoid confusion and error. 9 '
The supreme court first stated that if there is no dispute as to causally distinct
injuries, a trial court should determine, as a matter of law, that the successive
tortfeasor theory applies.' 92 The court believed that an early determination on the
type of liability (and the theory of apportionment) is beneficial because the parties
will know whether they are permitted to argue comparative fault at trial. 9 3 However,
if divisibility is unclear, the supreme court suggested that the trial court should
refrain from making a determination in place of the jury. " The court predicted that
these situations will result in heightened complexity at trial, particularly in asking
the jury to determine the appropriate theory of liability.195 In an effort to quell this
difficulty, the court presented a model for trial procedure when divisibility cannot
be determined as a matter of law.
19 6
The court began by stating that the jury should be asked a series of questions at
the close of evidence through the use of factual interrogatories, which will
ultimately determine the appropriate theory of liability. 197 The interrogatories will
first inquire into the defendant's negligence and then ask the jury to determine
"whether the evidence demonstrated causally distinct injuries."' 98 The jury's answer
to the question of divisibility would then determine whether the jury will proceed
under successive tortfeasor liability or comparative fault.' 99
189. Id.
190. For an excellent discussion of the proposed Uniform Jury Instruction modifications, see Ransom, supra
note 19, at 92-97.
191. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, I 39-47, 137 P.3d at 609-10.
192. Id. 1 42, 137 P.3d at 610. The New Mexico Supreme Court indicated that the trial court may also
determine that the successive tortfeasor theory applies as a matter of law when the plaintiff brings suit only against
the successive tortfeasor. Id.
193. See id. 41, 137 P.3d at 609 (when "the original tortfeasor causes a distinct original injury requiring
medical treatment, then [the original tortfeasor] is also the cause, as a matter of law, for the successive injury"); see,
e.g., id. 33 n.4, 137 P.3d at 608; supra note 91 and accompanying text. The original tortfeasor is not allowed to
compare his negligence with that of the successive tortfeasor to reduce his own liability. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
194. Id. 42-43, 137 P.3d at 610.
195. Id. 43, 137 P.3d at 610.
196. Id.(N44-47, 137 P.3d at 610.
197. Id. 44, 137 P.3d at 610. The court stated that alternate jury instructions will be available to address the
separate concurrent and successive theories and that the jury will proceed under the appropriate instruction after
answering a series of interrogatories. See id.
198. Id. 145, 137 P.3d at 610.
199. Id. If the jury finds that causally distinct injuries are present, the court believed that the next instruction
should ask the jury whether the original tortfeasor's negligence caused a distinct original injury. Id. 46, 137 P.3d
at 610. If the answer is no, the claim against the original tortfeasor is a nullity. Id. If yes, the original tortfeasor
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The court next examined the more complex situation where the plaintiff asserts
both concurrent and successive liability theories. 200 The court stated that counsel for
the parties should separate the claims under the appropriate theory of liability and
present them individually to the jury under the proper theory.20' The supreme court
felt that it was an error to group concurrent and successive tortfeasor claims together
as the trial court did in Payne.2 °2 After concluding its analysis, the court remanded
Payne for a new trial. 203
V. ANALYSIS
After the introduction of several liability in New Mexico, Payne v. Hall was the
first successive tortfeasor case to reach the New Mexico Supreme Court where the
original tortfeasor was sued for the entire injury under a theory of joint and several
liability.2°4 The Payne II holding firmly established an additional exception where
joint and several liability survives following the Several Liability Act of 1986.205 In
addition, Payne II directly addressed the most challenging questions in successive
tortfeasor cases: how to apportion the second injury (i.e., who should pay for it, how
much, and why), when a defendant may argue the comparative fault of the other
tortfeasor, and how broadly joint and several liability may be applied in the future.206
The New Mexico Supreme Court took the opportunity in Payne II to explore the
viability and workability of the varying approaches to these questions using
suggestions presented in Bartlett, Lujan, and Lewis.2 °7
This analysis begins by examining the Payne II approach to see how it applies
and affects multiple tortfeasor scenarios. 208 These examples will illustrate that, in the
interest of a full recovery, plaintiffs now have less discretion to pursue only one
theory of liability when divisible injuries are unclear.209 In addition, while
defendants are generally not permitted to argue comparative fault, the examples will
illustrate how defendants may successfully use proximate causation as an
affirmative defense. 2'0 This analysis then addresses how the New Mexico Supreme
Court could have reached a simpler, and arguably fairer, result in Payne H by using
the methods suggested by Judge Alarid and Martinez v. First National Bank of
Santa Fe.211
would be jointly and severally liable for the full extent of both injuries. Id. 145, 137 P.3d at 610. However, the court
noted that, where the plaintiff brings a claim against a successive tortfeasor, the jury should be asked to determine
the degree of enhancement caused by the successive tortfeasor's negligence. Id. 46 n.7, 137 P.3d at 610 n.7 (citing
Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 34, 35 P.3d 972, 986).
200. Id. [48, 137 P.3d at 611.
201. Id. 49, 137 P.3d at 611.
202. Id. 50, 137 P.3d at 611.
203. Id. 51, 137 P.3d at 611.
204. See id.; supra note 110 and accompanying text.
205. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 13, 137 P.3d at 604; see also supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
207. See infra Part V.A-B.
208. See infra Part V.A.
209. See infra Part V.A.
210. See infra Part V.A.
211. See infra Part V.B.
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A. Joint and Several Liability for Causally Distinct Injuries: The Payne
Approach
Prior to Payne II, the New Mexico Supreme Court had only decided cases against
the successive tortfeasor and, therefore, had only been able to theorize about the
potential liability for the original tortfeasor.212 Where both Lujan and Lewis
suggested that the original tortfeasor may be jointly and severally liable for the
entire harm, 13 Payne 11 presented an opportunity to explore and apply that thesis for
the first time.
Payne II stated that several liability is the general rule in multiple tortfeasor
scenarios.214 In addition, the New Mexico Supreme Court firmly established that the
injury, or the divisibility of the injuries, is the controlling factor in differentiating
between concurrent and successive tortfeasors and will therefore determine whether
several liability applies.215 Generally, when the injury is indivisible, the tortfeasors
are deemed concurrent and each tortfeasor is severally responsible for his individual
percentage of comparative fault in causing the injury.216 However, when the injuries
are divisible and causally distinct, the tortfeasors are deemed successive and present
an exception to the general rule of several liability.21 7 The original tortfeasor, if sued
alone, is jointly and severally liable for the entire harm,21 8 whereas the successive
tortfeasor, if sued alone, is fully liable for the second injury.219
The examples below will illustrate how the different theories of liability apply in
multiple tortfeasor scenarios, first by looking at suits where the plaintiff (P) sues
only the original tortfeasor (D1) and then at suits where the plaintiff sues only the
successive tortfeasor (D2). These examples will illustrate how the Payne I approach
affects the plaintiff, and how and when a defendant may argue comparative
negligence.
1. Plaintiff Sues Only the Original Tortfeasor (P v. D1)
Imagine a classic successive tortfeasor example like Lujan, where P and D, are
involved in a car accident; P suffers Injury 1 and requires medical care.220 P is taken
to the hospital, where D2, a doctor, negligently treats P and causes Injury 2.221 In
light of Payne II, if P sues only D,, then D1 may be fully liable for both Injury 1 and
212. See supra Part Bl.C.
213. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
215. The court in Payne II adopted the approach previously outlined in Lujan and Lewis without question.
See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
216. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 20, 148 P.3d 814, 820 (citing Payne v. Hall (Payne
11), 2006-NMSC-029, 1 11, 137 P.3d 599, 603); supra Part lI.A.
217. See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
218. GulfIns. Co., 2006-NMCA-150,1 20, 148 P.3d at 820 (citing Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029,1 14, 137 P.3d
at 604). More precisely, the original tortfeasor is fully liable for the first injury and is jointly and severally liable
for the second injury. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part IV.A.
220. See Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995); supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
221. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. For purposes of this example, the time frame between the
injuries is immaterial; the relevant focus is that there are two separate and distinct injuries.
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Injury 2.222 P must prove that Injury 1 and Injury 2 are separate and that the harm
caused by each injury is distinctly measurable.223 If P can establish that D, caused
Injury 1 and that a separate Injury 2 occurred later in the same causal sequence, then
the trial court must find that D, caused Injury 2 as a matter of law. 24 This rationale
assumes causation: because D, caused the first injury, D, is also responsible for the
sequence of events that led P to be injured by D2. D, is therefore wholly and solely
liable for both injuries.
This framework will not consider the extent of D2's role in causing Injury 2 and
will therefore prohibit D, from arguing comparative fault at trial.225 Specifically, D,
may not present evidence of D2's negligence in causing Injury 2 to try to reduce his
own liability for Injury 2.226 However, D, may argue that he did not cause any
original injury, and that any and all of P's injuries were caused solely by )2.227
Payne II held that this was a permissible proximate cause defense228 because D1 's
negligence alone, without an original injury, does not qualify for successive
tortfeasor liability.229 Accordingly, D, will be permitted to present evidence that he
was not the proximate cause of any of P's injuries; stated differently, D, may present
evidence that D2's negligence caused all of P's injuries.230 If D, successfully shows
that he did not cause an original injury, D, will escape joint and several liability.231
However, New Mexico courts have indicated that where D, did not cause a
distinct original injury, D, and D2 may be treated as concurrent tortfeasors who
together produce one indivisible injury.232 The courts would then apply comparative
fault to D, and D2, and D, would remain severally liable for his percentage of
negligence in contributing to P's injury.233 This illustrates that D, may reduce his
liability by arguing that he did not cause an original injury, but it may not allow him
to escape liability completely.23
When tortfeasors are deemed concurrent because the injury is indivisible, D, will
be allowed to argue comparative fault and present evidence that D2's negligence
222. See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text (D, will be fully liable for Injury 1 and jointly and
severally liable for Injury 2).
223. This comports with the Lewis test. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. If it is clear from the outset that there are causally divisible
injuries, the holding of Payne 11 indicates that the trial court should also determine that the case involves successive
tortfeasors as a matter of law. See infra Part VI.B.
225. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. D, is allowed to raise this argument without joining D2 as
a party, i.e., the "empty chair approach." See Occhialino, supra note 60, at 63-64. This was the argument
successfully employed by the defendants in Payne 11. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 169-171, 175-176, 186 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
232. See Payne v. Hall (Payne 11), 2006-NMSC-029, 28, 137 P.3d 599, 607 ("There are many scenarios in
which a defendant's negligence does not cause a separate injury, but may lead the victim to seek medical care, and
in that case the defendant's negligence would be a contributing factor to the injury resulting from subsequent
medical treatment."); supra note 176 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
234. This also illustrates how injuries may be considered "concurrent" although the negligence occurs at
wholly separate times. See, e.g., Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 137 P.3d 599.
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contributed to the injury in an effort to reduce his own liability.2 35 As in Bartlett, the
jury will be asked to determine the total of P's damages resulting from the injury
and then to apportion percentages of fault between and among each defendant for
their individual roles in causing the total damage.236 For example, the jury may
determine that P's total damage amounts to $100,000. Then, the jury may determine
that D, was twenty-five percent at fault for causing P's injury, and D 2 was seventy-
five percent at fault. Accordingly, if P has only sued D,, then P will only recover a
total of $25,000 from D,.237 This illustrates that when tortfeasors are concurrent, the
plaintiff must sue each tortfeasor that contributed to the injury if she wishes to
recover one hundred percent of her damages.238
2. Plaintiff Sues Only the Successive Tortfeasor (P v. D 2)
In a classic successive tortfeasor scenario, the original tortfeasor (D,) and the
successive tortfeasor (D 2) cause two separate injuries to the plaintiff. Assume now
that the plaintiff (P) has brought suit only against D2, as in Martinez, Lujan, and
Lewis.239 According to this line of jurisprudence, P must prove that Injury 1 and
Injury 2 are causally divisible and must also prove the amount of additional and
separate harm caused by Injury 2. IfP is successful, D 2 is fully liable for Injury 2.2'
Lewis held that D 2 may not argue comparative negligence at trial, i.e., D 2 may not
attempt to reduce her own liability by presenting evidence to show that D,'s
negligence contributed to Injury 2.241 However, Lewis illustrated that D 2 may argue
that she did not cause any appreciable enhancement to Injury I or, stated differently,
that D 2 did not cause any Injury 2 because all of P's damages occurred from Injury
1.242 If P is unable to establish that D 2 caused a distinct and measurable Injury 2,
Lewis indicated that D 2 will not be liable for any damages. 43 Accordingly, D, will
remain fully liable for the entire harm and P will not recover unless P joins or
separately pursues D,.
Compare the outcome above to a situation where P sues D, instead of D2. Where
D, was negligent but caused no distinct original injury (i.e., D 2 caused the entire
injury), D, will still be treated as a concurrent tortfeasor with D2 and will remain
liable for a percentage of the injury.2" However, where D 2 was negligent but did not
235. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. This also illustrates that the Bartlett holding, by adopting
several liability for concurrent tortfeasors, effectively reversed traditional tort principles for the apportionment of
damages. See supra Part ll.A (explaining how the adoption of comparative negligence led to the conclusion that
concurrent tortfeasors should not be jointly and severally liable for the entire harm). Prior to Bartlett, using the
above example where D1 was only twenty-five percent liable for causing P's injury, D1 would have to pay one
hundred percent of P's damages. Supra Part B.A. After Bartlett, D, will only pay damages in an amount equal to
his own percentage of negligence in contributing to P's injury. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
238. See Occhialino, supra note 60, at 38-39.
239. See supra Part ID.C.
240. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 107-108, 176 and accompanying text; Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 1 34,35 P.3d
972, 985-86 (stating that if the "injured party...is unable to establish the degree of enhancement, then the initial
tortfeasor [D,] remains responsible for the entire harm").
244. This is analogous to the facts of Payne. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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cause an appreciable second injury (i.e., D, caused the entire injury), D2 is not given
the same concurrent tortfeasor treatment as D,. Instead, D2 has established a
complete defense and removed all liability for damages.245 The explanation for this
inequitable treatment is temporal: DI's negligence was a direct cause of P's
exposure to D2's subsequent negligence, whereas this causal relationship does not
operate in reverse.
These examples provide an overview of various multiple tortfeasor fact-patterns
in light of Payne H. The plaintiff's options for recovery vary considerably
depending on which defendant(s) she joins and which theory of apportionment she
chooses to pursue. This analysis will now examine an alternative to the approach
adopted in Payne I.
B. The Concurrent Second Injury (CSI) Approach
When the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed that the injury was the
determinative factor in sorting through multi-tortfeasor liability, it effectively
rejected a more traditional rule that focused on causation. 246 To date, New Mexico
courts have not provided a rationale that explains why the distinction between
concurrent and successive tortfeasors (and the resulting examination of divisible
injuries) is relevant or useful in working through multi-tortfeasor fact patterns.247
The intrinsic problem with the Payne 1H approach is that it is often unclear whether
the injuries are divisible. As a result, multi-tortfeasor cases become increasingly
complex by requiring the parties to conform to one of two alternative apportionment
options when the facts may not easily lend themselves to either.248
An alternative to the Payne II approach exists in a traditional causation model.249
By focusing on causation rather than apportionment and divisibility, courts can
assign liability easily and fairly to the extent of each tortfeasors' fault. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals explored this fault-based approach in Martinez v. First
National Bank of Santa Fe,250 as did Judge Alarid in his special concurrence to the
Payne I decision, 251 and these suggestions form the basis of the Concurrent Second
Injury (CSI) approach.252
The CSI approach differs from the Payne II approach in two material ways.
Foremost, the CSI approach does not require a sharp distinction between concurrent
245. This is analogous to the facts of Lewis. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
247. Cf Payne v. Hall (Payne 1), 2004-NMCA-113, 35, 98 P.3d 1030, 1041 (Alarid, J., specially
concurring).
248. See generally Payne v. Hall (Payne 11), 2006-NMSC-029, 137 P.3d 599.
249. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
250. 107 N.M. 268, 270, 755 P.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1987). The CSI approach derives its name from the
comparative negligence approach suggested in Martinez. Id.
251. See supra notes 81-83, 147 and accompanying text.
252. The CSI approach has two primary benefits. First, multi-tortfeasor actions are simplified because the
parties are not required to conform to one of two rigid apportionment patterns. Cf supra Part u.C. Consequently,
the jury is not subjected to complex and confusing legal theory on liability, and the parties are free instead to focus
on proving and rebutting causation and damages. Liability will be borne out through the evidence and fault allocated
fairly to its source. The second benefit is conferred upon the defendant-fair apportionment of damages. Cf supra
notes 26, 52-58 and accompanying text. Yet, the CSI approach is not without its drawbacks. Contrary to the New
Mexico Supreme Court's express desire in Lujan, the CSI approach shifts the risk of insolvency to the plaintiff. Cf
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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and successive tortfeasor liability.253 Rather than adhering to two competing and
confusing theories of apportionment, Judge Alarid suggested that multi-tortfeasor
actions could be decided using a singular theory that looks only at negligence and
proximate causation to determine liability.254 The analysis is simple: Where the
original tortfeasor's negligence causes the plaintiff to seek care from the successive
tortfeasor, "the wrongful conduct of the original tortfeasor continues to operate as
a proximate cause" of any injury caused by the successive tortfeasor, unless "an
unforeseeable, superseding cause ...cuts off the initial wrongdoer's liability.,
255
Notably, however, this analysis applies regardless of the presence of a distinct
original injury; the original tortfeasor's negligence results in a completed tort as
soon as the plaintiff suffers an injury, regardless of when the injury occurs in the
causal sequence or how many separate injuries eventually manifest, and therefore,
it is not necessary to focus on the divisibility of the injury or injuries because the
original tortfeasor's liability is rooted in causation as a whole, rather than causation
of an original injury. 6
To apportion liability, the CSI approach borrows from the logic in Martinez and
would apply comparative fault and several liability in all instances where the
original and the successive tortfeasors' negligence combines to cause an injury,
which represents the second divergence from the Payne H approach.257 The Martinez
court appeared to recognize that, in successive tortfeasor actions, the second injury
is in essence a concurrent tort.258 This concept is illustrated by a classic successive
tortfeasor example where the original tortfeasor (D,) causes Injury 1; D,'s
negligence then causally leads the plaintiff (P) to seek medical care from the
successive tortfeasor (D2), where D2's negligence causes Injury 2. Taken alone,
Injury 2 is a separate, yet indivisible injury caused by the negligence of both D, and
D2, i.e., Injury 2 is a concurrent tort.259 New Mexico courts have long recognized
that concurrent tortfeasors are subject to several liability for causing an indivisible
injury to the plaintiff. Accordingly, Martinez rightly suggested that D, and D2
should be severally liable for Injury 2.260 The CSI approach adopts this logic and
applies several liability to any injury caused by the combined negligence of D, and
D2.
To illustrate the benefit of this approach, envision a case where the original
tortfeasor (D,) negligently causes a collision with the plaintiff (P). P then goes to the
emergency room for evaluation, where she is negligently treated by the successive
253. See Payne v. Hall (Payne 1), 2004-NMCA- 113, 35, 98 P.3d 1030, 1041 (Alarid, J., specially
concurring); see also supra notes 23, 147 and accompanying text.
254. See Payne I, 2004-NMCA-113, 1 35-37, 98 P.3d at 1041 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
255. See id. 37,98 P.3d at 1041. Under this approach, the distinction between the original and the successive
tortfeasor is relevant for sorting through the temporal sequence of events but is not required for the purpose of
apportioning fault. Id. 1 35-37, 98 P.3d at 1041.
256. Id.
257. Cf. supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
258. Cf. supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
259. Similar to Lujan, D,'s negligence caused P to seek additional medical treatment from D2, whose
negligence caused a second injury. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. D, is liable because his negligence
was the proximate cause of P seeing D2 when she did. See Payne 1, 2004-NMCA-1 13,1 37, 98 P.3d at 1041 (Alarid,
J., specially concurring); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Part H.A.
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tortfeasor (D 2) and suffers an injury.26 ' In this scenario, the Payne II approach will
treat P's injury at the hospital differently depending upon whether D1 caused a
distinct original injury during the collision.262 If an original injury is present, then
D, is jointly and severally liable for the harm that occurred at the hospital; if there
was no discernable original injury, D, and D2 will be treated as concurrent
tortfeasors and each will be severally liable for the injury at the hospital.26 3
Accordingly, under the Payne II approach, P's theory of recovery is contingent upon
the presence of a distinct original injury.2 4
Understandably, the "contingent-negligence" dichotomy created by Lujan and
Lewis is responsible for the confusion in successive tortfeasor actions. Yet, this
confusion is easily remedied through a blanket application of several liability and
comparative fault.265 Under the CSI approach, D,'s liability is not contingent upon
a completed tort prior to P's interaction with D2, nor does it require the presence of
distinctly divisible injuries; rather, the CSI approach will hold D, and D 2 severally
liable for the injury at the hospital as long as D,'s negligence was a proximate cause
of that injury.266 To establish proximate causation, P must simply show that D,'s
negligence caused P to seek further medical care from D2, and that P was injured
during the course of that treatment. 267 If P establishes causation, then the jury will
compare D,'s negligence to D 2's negligence and apportion fault accordingly.268
Although the CSI approach presents an attractive alternative, Payne H is rooted
in twenty-five years of well-reasoned jurisprudence and represents New Mexico's
unique approach to multi-tortfeasor liability. A wise practitioner will seek to
understand the court's apportionment patterns in an effort to successfully navigate
within them throughout multi-tortfeasor litigation. The following section will
address how practitioners may choose and apply the lessons from Payne II in their
litigation strategy.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
This section addresses how practitioners may and should approach multi-
tortfeasor cases throughout the various stages of litigation in light of Payne H. The
first section will evaluate how a practitioner may choose and apply the appropriate
theory of apportionment. The following section will examine how to present the
261. This example was loosely borrowed from Judge Alarid's special concurrence. See Payne I, 2004-NMCA-
113, 1 39, 98 P.3d at 1041 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
262. See supra Part V.A.
263. See supra Part V.A.
264. See supra Part V.A.
265. See supra Part V.A.
266. Cf Payne I, 2004-NMCA-113, 46, 98 P.3d at 1042-43 (Alarid, J., specially concurring); Martinez v.
First Nat'l Bank of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 268, 270, 755 P.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1987).
267. Payne I, 2004-NMCA-113, 46, 98 P.3d at 1042-43.
268. A secondary consequence of the CSI approach is that the defendant, whether the original or the
successive tortfeasor, should always be permitted to introduce evidence of comparative fault if the negligence of
others contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text. Applying comparative
fault, each Defendant's potential liability for Injury 2 may range from zero to one hundred percent. While D, may
still be held fully responsibility for Injury 2 under this approach, it will occur only as a result of ajury's deliberation
and not as a matter of law. Cf supra note 169 and accompanying text. Further, P may need to sue both D, and D 2
to fully recover for Injury 2, indicating that successive tortfeasor actions should always include all liable tortfeasors
as defendants. See infra Part VI.A.
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applicable theory at trial and will conclude with an evaluation of the newly adopted
jury instructions.
A. Pre-Trial Practice
There are two primary considerations before any multiple tortfeasor action
reaches trial: which theory of liability to pursue and how to frame the injury to
comport with the chosen theory. The foremost consideration, from the plaintiff's
perspective, is which theory of liability to pursue, as that theory will ultimately
determine the extent of the damages to which she is entitled. There are three options
available: The plaintiff may argue concurrent tortfeasor liability,269 successive
tortfeasor liability,270 or both in the alternative. While there are a multitude of factors
to consider when choosing the appropriate theory, the primary consideration should
always be whether the plaintiffs injury is clearly divisible.271 When divisibility is
unclear, Payne II illustrates that there are certain risks in choosing only one theory
of apportionment and, therefore, a wise practitioner should always argue both.
In successive tort actions, plaintiffs will generally achieve the best result by
joining all liable tortfeasors. Failing full joinder, however, a plaintiff is always
guaranteed an incomplete recovery by choosing to pursue the successive tortfeasor
alone because she will only be compensated for the second injury.272 Understanding
that, a plaintiff may instead pursue the original tortfeasor alone in an effort to hold
the original tortfeasor jointly and severally liable for the entire harm.273 In this
instance, the plaintiff is required to prove that she suffered two causally distinct
injuries resulting from the original tortfeasor' s negligence.274 A successful argument
allows the plaintiff to achieve a full recovery from a single defendant and is
particularly beneficial where the plaintiff faces difficulty in joining the successive
tortfeasor(s). 275 However, the inherent and real danger in pursuing the original
tortfeasor alone is that, failing proof of separate injuries, a plaintiff will recover
nothing at all.276 Therefore, when divisibility of the injury is unclear, successive
269. A concurrent tortfeasor theory will subject the defendant(s) to several liability. See supra notes 55-59
and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text. The successive tortfeasor theory will subject the
original tortfeasor to full liability for the first injury and joint and several liability for the second injury.
Alternatively, this apportionment theory will subject the successive tortfeasor to joint and several liability for the
second injury.
271. In addition to divisibility, practitioners should also consider the feasibility of joining all liable
defendants. Joinder, however, may present other problems ranging from statutes of limitation/repose to immunity
to insolvency. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. While these difficulties will impact the parties' pre-trial
planning, divisibility of the injury still represents the primary consideration in which theory of apportionment is
appropriate.
272. See supra notes 92, 157 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
275. This difficulty is exemplified by Payne, where the Hospital could not be joined as a defendant because
the two-year statute of repose had run, and by Bartlett, where the second tortfeasor was wholly unknown. See supra
notes 50, 126 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part 1V.B. The Payne litigation shows that while successive tortfeasor liability may allow a
plaintiff to achieve a full recovery from the original tortfeasor, it is often a more difficult case to prove. For a
discussion on how modified jury instructions may cure this defect in successive tortfeasor liability, see infra Part
VI.B.
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tortfeasor liability carries a higher burden and a higher risk for the plaintiff by
requiring the plaintiff to make an all-or-nothing case for recovery.
Alternatively, concurrent tortfeasor liability2" allows the plaintiff to choose one
or any number of defendants and allows more flexibility in crafting the case. The
benefits of this option are best exemplified by the outcome in Payne II; if Ms. Payne
had pursued the Clinic under a concurrent tortfeasor theory, she may have obtained
a partial recovery from the Clinic even in the absence of a distinct original injury.278
In this example, a partial recovery is preferable to the failed recovery that ensued
when Ms. Payne was unable to establish divisible injuries in her successive
tortfeasor claim. 279 Yet, several liability may complicate the plaintiffs pre-litigation
planning by requiring the plaintiff to identify and join all liable tortfeasors in order
to obtain a full recovery. 280 The risk of an incomplete recovery is exemplified by
Bartlett, where one of the concurrent tortfeasors was wholly unknown, thereby
preventing the plaintiff from ever achieving a full recovery.28' Therefore, in light of
the risks and benefits posed by both theories, Payne II illustrates that, when
divisibility of the injury is unclear, the risks of a failed or partial recovery may
effectively be lessened by pursuing both theories in the alternative.
After selecting the appropriate theory of liability, the second pre-trial
consideration is how to frame the plaintiffs injury to comport with the chosen
theory. Generally, this tactic is only necessary where a plaintiff has elected to pursue
successive tortfeasor liability, which requires the plaintiff to plead and prove the
presence of two causally divisible injuries.282 Because the determinative issue is the
injury, the plaintiffs ability to achieve a full recovery from the original tortfeasor
using joint and several liability will hinge on how she frames the injuries.
Significantly, when the court explored divisibility in Payne II, it may have
opened the door to a broader application of joint and several liability by stating that,
"[d]epending on the specific facts and circumstances of a given case, [pain and
suffering] might constitute the distinct original injury necessary under successive
tortfeasor liability, as long as we can decide it was foreseeable as a matter of law
that medical treatment would be sought., 28 3 Accordingly, a plaintiff may use "pain
and suffering" to obtain joint and several liability against an original tortfeasor.2
Yet, because "pain and suffering" is a broad and ambiguous injury that may be
alleged in the absence of an original physical injury, this language seems counter to
the court's stated desire to restrict joint and several liability to a narrow class of
277. For purposes of this section, the author uses "several liability" and "concurrent tortfeasor liability"
interchangeably.
278. See supra Part V.A.I.
279. See supra Part V.A.I.
280. See Occhialino, supra note 60, at 38-39 ("The task of identifying and suing other tortfeasors fell upon
the targeted defendant who might seek contribution or indemnity from them if held liable for all the plaintiffs
injuries.").
281. See supra Part n.A.
282. See supra Part IH.A.
283. Payne v. Hall (Payne 11), 2006-NMSC-029, 30, 137 P.3d 599, 607.
284. Id. For example, if Ms. Payne had successfully established that she experienced pain and suffering at
the Clinic, then the Clinic may have been jointly and severally liable for the entire harm. See supra note 158.
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cases.285 It seems likely that the courts will need to revisit and clarify this suggestion
in the future.
B. Trial and Jury Instructions
Trial procedure has been a contentious source of dispute in multi-tortfeasor cases,
particularly in relation to the plaintiff's burden of proof and the defendant's desire
to argue comparative fault when the divisibility of the plaintiff's injury is unclear.286
To reduce the possibility of error, Payne II suggested a model of trial procedure
designed to minimize prejudice to the parties and confusion for the jury.287 The
success of this model is contingent on accurate jury instructions, which are
discussed in more detail at the conclusion of this section.
In any multi-tortfeasor action, there is a general consensus that when the
divisibility of the injury is not in dispute, the court should determine the appropriate
theory of liability as a matter of law prior to the start of trial.288 The parties may
accomplish this by stipulation or by submitting a motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of divisibility. 289 After "the trial court make[s] such a deter-
mination one way or the other (concurrent tortfeasor liability versus successive
tortfeasor liability), 290 evidence of comparative fault may be permitted or limited
and the jury will receive a singular instruction in accord with the proper theory of
apportionment.
291
The result is not as tidy, however, when divisibility is unclear at the time of trial;
divisibility remains a question of fact reserved for the jury292 and the resulting trial
necessarily becomes more complex.293 However, the complexity of successive
tortfeasor actions can be mitigated through precautions taken during trial, in addition
to specialized jury instructions tailored to multi-tortfeasor cases.294
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Payne II suggested an approach that allows
the parties to present evidence on causation, liability, and divisibility at trial without
adhering to a particular theory.295 Under this approach, the parties are prevented
from arguing comparative fault in an effort to avoid tainting the jury.296 At the close
of evidence, the jury will determine the applicable theory of apportionment through
285. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part IV.A-B.
287. See supra Part IV.C-D.
288. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text. The court stated that if the trial court could determine
before hearing the evidence that the case involved successive tortfeasor liability, then the parties should be informed
not to argue comparative fault. See Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029, 140, 137 P.3d at 609.
289. Note that in successive tortfeasor actions, the plaintiff may also wish to file a companion motion in
limine to restrict evidence of comparative fault.
290. Payne If, 2006-NMSC-029, 41, 137 P.3d 599, 609 (quoting Lewis v. Samson, 1999-NMCA-145,
55, 992 P.2d 282, 295).
291. Id. 141, 137 P.3d at 609-10.
292. Id. 742, 137 P.3d at 610. In the absence of this determination, the jury must decide whether two distinct
injuries occurred and then proceed under the appropriate theory.
293. See id. 142,48, 137 P.3d at 610-11. If there is a question of whether two causally distinct injuries are
present, then the appropriate theory is also unclear until the close of evidence, thereby delaying a determination of
whether the case involves several liability and comparative fault for concurrent tortfeasors or joint and several
liability for successive tortfeasors. Id.
294. See supra note 147.
295. See Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 43-47, 137 P.3d at 610.
296. See id. 1 40, 137 P.3d at 609; supra Part IV.D.
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the use of factual interrogatories, which ask questions regarding negligence,
* 297
causation, and the presence of a distinct original injury. Based on the jury's
conclusion regarding divisibility, it will proceed under either the concurrent or the
successive theory of liability. 298 Despite the clarity afforded by this approach, a
problem may arise where a defendant is deprived of its rightful opportunity to
present evidence of comparative fault in the event that the action is deemed
concurrent, and it is unclear whether this may constitute reversible error.299
Following the suggestions in Payne II, the Uniform Jury Instructions Committee
for Civil Cases proposed a set of jury instructions that specifically addressed
multiple tortfeasor fact patterns and those instructions were adopted by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in January 2008. 300 Prior to the adoption of these uniform
instructions, the court and counsel were forced to craft an ad hoc set of jury
instructions for multiple tortfeasor cases based on causation, liability, and damages.
The newly adopted instructions address all of these elements as they specifically
apply to each of four successive tortfeasor scenarios.
The three initial instructions, 13-1802B, 13-1802C, and 13-1802D, are designed
for successive tort actions where the plaintiff's injuries are clearly divisible and are
not in dispute.30' These individualized instructions eliminate confusion regarding the
type of liability attached to each party and eliminate unnecessary considerations for
the jury. For example, the jury is not asked about the divisibility of the injuries or
the plaintiffs burden of proving distinct injuries because these instructions are
specifically limited to cases where divisibility was determined prior to trial.
The first proposed instruction, 13-1802B, is written for situations where the
plaintiff sues only the original tortfeasor.302 This instruction comports with the
holding in Payne H and states that the first tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable
for both the first and any subsequent injuries.3 °3 It is noteworthy, however, that this
297. Payne II, 2006-NMSC-029, 44, 137 P.3d at 610.
298. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
299. Cf. Yardman v. San Juan Downs, Inc., 120 N.M. 751, 756-57, 906 P.2d 742, 747-48 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on comparative fault was reversible error where such an
instruction was supported by substantial evidence).
300. See UJI 13-1802B to 1802E NMRA, in State Bar of New Mexico, In the Matter of the Adoption of New
Jury Instructions 13-1802B, 13-1802C, 13-1802D, 13-1802E, 13-222, and Appendix to Chapter 18for Civil Cases,
BAR BuLL., Jan. 14,2008, at 21, available at http://www.nmbar.org/Attomeys/lawpubs/BB/bb2008/BB011408.pdf
[hereinafter New Jury Instructions]; State Bar of New Mexico, Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Jury
Instructions-Civil, BAR BULL., Feb. 26, 2007, at 17, available at http://www.nmbar.org/Attorneyslawpubs/BB/
bb2007/BB022607.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Revisions]. Prior to the publication of these instructions, a variety of
model instructions had been suggested. See Payne 11, 2006-NMSC-029, l 43-47, 137 P.3d at 610 (proposed
instruction model); Payne v. Hall (Payne 1), 2004-NMCA-1 13, 46, 98 P.3d 1030, 1042-43 (Alarid, J., specially
concurring) (Judge Alarid's proposed instruction model); Ransom, supra note 19, at 92-97 (Justice Ransom's
proposed instruction model).
301. See New Jury Instructions, supra note 300, at 21-22. The parties may have stipulated or the court may
have decided as a matter of law that two causally distinct injuries are present.
302. See id. 13-1802B, which is entitled "Suit against original tortfeasor; divisibility of injuries not in dispute;
medical treatment," reads:
In this case, if you find that (one or more original tortfeasor(s)) [was] [were]
negligent and caused injury to the plaintiff, [he] [she] [it] [they] [is] [are] also responsible for any
harm caused by medical care that the plaintiffs injury reasonably required, even if the medical
care was negligently performed.
Id.
303. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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instruction, as written, is limited to situations where the second injury is caused by
medical negligence.
The next instruction, 13-1802C, addresses suits solely against the successive
tortfeasor. 35 Borrowing from the holdings in Payne II, Lewis, and Lujan, the
proposed instruction asks the jury to consider the plaintiff s original and successive
injuries separately to determine damages. However, 13-1802C clearly instructs that
the successive tortfeasor is only liable for the second injury.
Finally, 13-1802D was written for situations where the plaintiff brings suit
against both the original and the successive tortfeasor in the same action and
divisible injuries are clearly present.3° This instruction walks the jury through a
series of questions regarding negligence and damages to determine separate amounts
for the original and the successive injuries. Although 13-1802D instructs the jury to
consider the original tortfeasor's negligence separately from that of the successive
tortfeasor, a problem arises when the jury is asked to "compare the negligence of
each person whose [negligence] [fault] contributed to the second injury. '30 8 As
written, this instruction may invite the jury to compare the original tortfeasor's
negligence to that of the successive tortfeasor for the second injury, in clear
contradiction of Lujan.3 ' Despite this anomalous language, the sample verdict form
reveals the committee's true intent: the jury is to compare the negligence of the
plaintiff to that of the defendant and determine comparative fault.310 Accordingly,
the particular difficulty with this instruction may be eliminated through a statement
that the original tortfeasor's negligence is not to be considered when apportioning
the second injury.31'
The fourth and final instruction, 13-1802E, applies when divisibility of the injury
is unclear, regardless of which tortfeasor or combination thereof the plaintiff
chooses to pursue.312 This instruction largely adopts suggestions from Payne II
specifically by using sample verdict forms that take the jury through a series of
questions to determine the applicable theory of liability.313 The instruction first asks
304. See New Jury Instructions, supra note 300. This instruction aligns with and supports the Lewis intent
to limit joint and several liability to these very situations. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
305. See New Jury Instructions, supra note 300, at 21. 13-1 802C, which is entitled "Successive tortfeasor only
defendant; no question for jury on divisibility of injuries," reads:
In this case, the plaintiff says and has the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence
that _(the successive tortfeasor(s)) caused injuries that were separate and distinct
from, or that caused a measurable worsening of, injuries the plaintiff received from
(the original injury). In determining what damages, if any, were caused by
(the successive tortfeasor(s)), you should award the plaintiff compensation only
for [the separate injury caused by (the successive tortfeasor(s))] [the measurable
worsening of the plaintiff's condition caused by (the successive
tortfeasor(s))] [harm that would have been avoided had - (the successive
tortfeasor) [not been negligent][acted within the standard of care]], but not for damages from
(the first or original injury).
Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 22.
308. See id.
309. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
310. New Jury Instructions, supra note 300, at 23.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 22-23.
313. See id.; supra Part l.D.
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whether at least one original tortfeasor and one successive tortfeasor were
negligent.3 4 The Committee reasoned that "[u]nless the jury finds at least one
[concurrent] and at least one [successive tortfeasor] to be liable, it is unnecessary to
present the question of divisibility to the jury because the defendants liable will be
concurrent tortfeasors, as regards to either the original or successive injuries."3 5
After determining liability, the jury will then decide whether the injuries are
divisible. Based on the jury's conclusion, it will proceed under either the concurrent
or the successive theory. Interestingly, where a plaintiff seeks joint and several
liability under the successive tortfeasor theory, the instruction allows the jury to
default to concurrent tortfeasor liability if the plaintiff fails to prove divisible
injuries.1 6 Accordingly, the plaintiff benefits from the option of proceeding under
either theory depending on whether she meets her burden to prove divisibility.
Where the injuries are divisible and the successive tort theory applies, the jury
will follow a series of questions tailored from the Payne II opinion that divide and
apportion liability between the original and successive tortfeasor." 7 If the injuries
are indivisible, then the jury will proceed under the concurrent tort theory and is
instructed to "compare the negligence of all parties you find to be responsible for the
injuries and the defendant will be responsible for its proportionate share of the
plaintiff's damages. 318 While this instruction is straightforward, it appears to
disregard the Lewis dichotomy that removes liability for the successive tortfeasor
in the absence of a clear second injury.3'9 Accordingly, this instruction may need
additional interpretation by the court at trial, particularly where the successive
tortfeasor has asserted a proximate cause defense.
VII. CONCLUSION
While Payne v. Hall did not present any fundamental change in New Mexico law,
it did present an opportunity to examine and clarify a complex and confusing area
of jurisprudence. Payne II adopted the principles set forth in Lujan and Lewis and
provided a working example of how to analyze successive tortfeasor fact-patterns.
However, while Payne I has set forth definitive rules of law for multi-tortfeasor
scenarios, there are still practical questions that linger. Comparative fault, for
example, remains a particularly contentious issue and will likely continue to
reappear in future multi-tortfeasor actions.
Payne II is perhaps most valuable as an example of the difficulties a plaintiff may
experience by choosing to pursue a singular theory of apportionment and how a
plaintiffs recovery may hinge on how she frames the injury. Yet, the most
enlightening aspect of Payne II was the realization that the prior uniform jury
instructions were inadequate to assist practitioners, the court, and the jury in
working through these complex issues. The suggestions found within the Payne II
opinion have led to the proposal and adoption of new Uniform Jury Instructions to
314. See New Jury Instructions, supra note 300, at 19-20.
315. See Proposed Revisions, supra note 300, at 20 (emphasis added).
316. See New Jury Instructions, supra note 300, at 23.
317. See id. at 19-20.
318. Seeid. at22.
319. See id.; supra Part V.A.
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better equip attorneys and the jury in presenting and understanding the complexities
of successive tortfeasor liability. These instructions may provide the clarity that the
court has been aspiring to achieve since it began this evolution over twenty-five
years ago.
